Stormy waters: technology, sea control and regional warfare by Schnell, David Allan
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1994-06
Stormy waters: technology, sea control and regional warfare
Schnell, David Allan.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42916
AD-A283 945 
11~1111111 ~Ill~~~ ~ll Ill\\ l~ll 11111111 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 
DilC 
SELECTE 0 SEI' G 1994 THESIS 
......... ~··- ... - .. -------
_ __, 
S'l'ORIIY WATERS: 
TBCIDfOLOGY I SEA COIITROL AND RBGIOifAL WARFARE 
by 
David Allan Schnell 
June 1994 
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Paul Stockton 
Co-Advisor: Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. 
Approved for PUblic release; distribution is unlimited 
94-28508 I ~ JlfiC QU,....._ ~..<.W.I.'.IID l. 
IIIII/I IIIII fl~ Ill ~Ill ~Ill 11~11111111 ~ 94 9 01 099 
(}) 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approv•d OM8 No. 0104·0188 
''*t< rtrDO"t'"f our*" for t.,u, collectiOft of •rdOtmat•o" '' fttu"•tM to lwe-t~• 1 ~"~Our ger 't'loCIO"te. tnctuclu'g t~ t•l'fM' for r.-v•ew•ng •nttructiOn\, werct'h"f .,.,,t,ng dlta tourcft. 
911...,,"9 llld "'"'"11"''"9 t~ clatallftCIM. and COIIIQjeto"t alld ,.,., ... ,"9 th• coll•ct•on ot onformatoon \end comment~ :'f!rcl<ng 11111 bolr~ ftttmate or any ot,., .-.,of""' cOI~oOft ot tnlor..,at<Ofl. onclucl<ftt :"m''OM tor '""''"9 '"" burCS." to ""•>h•ngton ... eciQ~art••' \efloocft. Oor.aor•t• or tnlormato~ OM<atoon. olld R~rt\. 1l15 Jetf.,_ 
D••" Htgll .. oy. ,.,,,. 120.. Arlington. 1/ 22202,.:102. •lid tot~ Ottoc• ot ""''"•"'•"' olld ll>clg•t. ~.-ora ""..ct<Ofl ~otect(070..QIIII. Was/longton. OC 20SOJ 
t. AGENCY USE ONLY (L .. ~ bl•nlc) 12. ~PORT Dr9~ 1 June 4 13. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Masters Thesis 
•. nTU AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
Stormy Waters: Technology, Sea Control and Regional Warfare 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
David A. Schnell 
7. PERfORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) I. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER 
Monterey. CA 93943-5000 
t. SPONSORING I MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING I MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. ~PLE..,ENTARY NOTES 
e vtews expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A 
13. ABSTRACT (M•Jtimum 200 words) 
An imponant aspect of the current strategic calculus is the diffusion of technology and 
proliferation of advanced weaponry, particularly naval weapon systems. This is of particular 
concern for the United States' Navy, historically the first on-scene and the likely target of any 
initial challenge to our presence. The Navy's new warfighting doctrine, " ... From the Sea" 
focuses the Navy on these challenges. However, it has not been complimented by the necessary 
recapitalization and procurement to make it truly operational. To bridge the gap between the 
doctrinal concepts of " ... From the Sea" and current capabilities, the Navy must improve its 
ability to exercise sea control and dominate the littoral battlespace. This will require tough 
procurement choices and significant investments in mine warfare, advanced military aircraft and 
state-of-the-art C4I systems. It may also be necessary for the Navy to postpone certain 
improvements or abandon certain missions in order to refocus and selectively modernize elements 
of the fleet. 
1 •. SUIJECT TERMS U.S. Navy, Technology Proliferation, Sea Control, 
.. 
. . . From the Sea," Naval Doctrine 
n. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 11. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
~~Med 0 't!NalAtlied OF ~L~'railified 
NSN 7540.01·280·5500 1 
15. NUMBER OF PAGES 
165 
16. PRICE CODE 
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 
UL 
St•ndard Form 298 {Rev 2·89) 
Pr-nbee' ...... AN\1 WJ Zl9-tt 
1n-·":. 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
Stor11y Waters: 
Technology, sea Control and Regional Warfare 
by 
David Allan Schnell 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A. State University of New York at Potsdam, 1983 
Author: 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the deqree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 
from the 




Dr. Thomas c. Bruneau, Chairman 
Department of National Security Affairs 
i i 
ABSTRACT 
An important aspect of the current strateg~c calculus is 
the diffusion of technology and proliferation of advanced 
weaponry, particularly naval: weapon systems. This is of 
particular concern for the United ~---~' Navy, historically 
the first on-scene and the likely t""rqet of any initial 
challenge to our presence. The Navy's new warfighting 
doctrine, " ••. From the Sea" focuses the Navy on these 
challenges. However, it has not been compl imenl:ed by ":he 
necessary recapitalization and procurement to make it trul.:..· 
operational. To bridge the gap between the doctrinal concept~ 
of " ••. From the Sea" and current capabilities, the Navy must 
improve its ability to exercise sea control and dominate the 
1 i ttoral battlespace. This wi 11 require tough procurement 
choices and significant investments in mine warfare, advanced 
military aircraft and state-of-the-art C4I systems. It may 
also be necessary for the Navy to postpone certain 
improvements or abandon certain missions in order to refocus 
and selectively modernize elements of the fleet . 
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I. IHTRODUCTIOM 
Since 1990, the United States' military has struggled to 
adapt its Cold War systems tc the changes in the world's 
strategic landscape and the future threats which are emerging. 
For the u.s. Navy, this has produced " .•• From the Sea," a 
document which seeks to define a combined vision for the Navy 
and Marine Corps. 1 Unfortunately, the world has been 
complicated by the diffusion of high technology and the 
proliferation of advanced weapon systems. This will present 
challenges for the U.s. Navy as it seeks to perform its 
traditional missions of presence, crisis response and power 
projection. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the u.s. Navy's 
new doctrine " ••• From the Sea" and determine what impact this 
spread of technology will have on the Navy's future 
operations. My hypothesis is that "· .• From the sea" is 
exactly the type of doctrine that the Navy needs to meet the 
challenges of the future. However, our procurement strategies 
don't match the rhetoric; we still appear to be locked into a 
Cold War mentality which focuses on enhancing our already 
1 The full title of this document is " ... From the sea; 
Preparing the Naval Service for the Twenty-First Century," 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1992). 
1 
formidable power projection capabilities rather than on 
improving our ability to control the battlespace of the 
littorals. Given the increasingly sophisticated military 
threat in the Third World and the nature of the operations 
which " ..• From the Sea" espouses, we may arrive on-scene with 
the wrong tools and at an initial tactical disadvantage. 
The industrial revolution and the machine age produced a 
series of technologies which have dramatically and profoundly 
influenced warfare at sea. However, only when technological 
advances are combined with organizational and doctrinal 
changes, are they capable of revolutionizing warfare at sea. 
The "Military-Technical Revolution" which appears to be on the 
horizon holds the promise of providing even greater 
revolutionary changes in naval strategy, doctrine and tactics. 
Chapter II presents a historical overview of the influence 
that technology has had on modern naval warfare and doctrine. 
Chapter III examines the applicability of " ••• From the 
Sea" and gunboat diplomacy in a world where technology 
diffusion and the proliferation of advanced weaponry has given 
many Third World navies the ability to challenge the u.s. 
Navy. Examining " ••• From the sea" from an adversary's point 
of view can help us understand the nature of the threat which 
naval and expeditionary forces may face in the littoral 
regions of the world. 
The current international setting is complicated by the 
2 
diffusion of technology and the proliferation of sophisticated 
weapon systems and sensors. our adversaries are acquiring 
small, lightweight weapons, advanced technologies and access 
to real-time targeting and intelligence sources. Naval forces 
must be prepared to face high-technology, combined-arms 
threats in every region of the world. Chapter IV addresses 
the threat that sophisticated sensor technologies, advanced 
conventional weapon systems and weapons of mass destruction 
may pose for u.s. Naval forces conducting the missions which 
" ... From the Sea" envisions. 
If doctrinal development is not accompanied by a 
concurrent period of equipment development and procurement, 
there will be an unacceptable delay between the acquisition of 
the new technology and the realization of the operational 
capability. 2 Shifting our procurement strategies, training 
emphasis and concept of operations towards the realities of 
littoral warfare is critical to the future success of the u.s. 
Navy. Chapter v seeks to operationalize " .•• From the Sea" by 
making recommendations which will improve the ability of the 
United States Navy to exercise sea control and battlespace 
dominance in the littoral regions of the world. Conclusions 
and a bibliography are presented at the end of the thesis. 
2James A. Donovan (USMC, Ret.), "New Concepts and New 
Doctrine," Harine Corps Gazette 76 (June 1992): 42. 
3 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
If the lessons of history teach us anything, it is that 
we don't need to face a first-class fleet to find 
ourselves in a first-class fight. 3 
The history of naval warfare has been characterized by 
certain watersheds which have altered the way that war is 
waged at sea. Like land warfare, technical advances in the 
field of naval warfare have been aimed at neutralizing or 
defeating an opponent's advantage. Once neutralized, the 
immediate tactical advantage could then be exploited before an 
adversary was able to counter it. 
In the past, technological advances in naval warfare have 
been primarily aimed at empowering the large, capital ships of 
the world's great navies. Today, advances in weapons 
technology have given smaller ships, aircraft and submarines 
the ability to compete along the littorals and challenge the 
United states Navy if they choose. As these lesser states' 
ability and readiness to challenge the u.s. Navy increases, 
maintaining our technological edge becomes both critical and 
more difficult to achieve. 
3Michael Poirier, (Lieutenant Commander, USN), "Sea control 
and Regional Warfare." u.s. Naval Institute Proceeding~ 119 (July 
1993): 65. 
4 
Technology has dramatically altered the character of naval 
warfare in the last two centuries. In the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century, steam propulsion, steel hull construction 
and advanced gunnery techniques radically changed the nature 
of naval warships. Before the Navy could grasp the doctrinal 
implications of these new technologies, they were overturned 
by the submarine and the airplane which expanded the realm of 
naval warfare below and above the ocean's surface. Nuclear 
weapons and the advent of accurate guided missiles further 
altered the calculus of naval warfare. 
This chapter presents a historical overview of the role 
that technology has had on modern naval warfare and how naval 
doctrine has been shaped by these advances. The focus is on 
"modern" naval warfare, that period which began with the 
invention of steam propulsion, effectively ending three 
thousand years of sailed warships. It also analyzes the 
difficulties with which new technologies are incorporated into 
existing military systems and the sometimes innovative and 
radicaJ changes in doctrine and tactics which have accompanied 
certain technological advances. 
A. TECIDIOLOGY AIID MAVAL WARFARE 
On October 21, 1805 the last great sea battle between 
wooden-hulled, sail-rigged ships-of-the-line took place off 
the southwest coast of Spain at Trafalgar. Admiral Lord 
Nelson probably could not have imagined the changes that naval 
5 
warfare would undergo in the next two hundred years. Since 
then, many inventions and innovative tactics have changed the 
character of .1aval warfare. The industrial revolution and the 
machine age produced a series of technologies which have 
dramatically and profoundly influenced warfare at sea. The 
"Military-Technical Revolution" holds the promise of providing 
revolutionary changes which will affect the naval strategy, 
doctrine and tactics in ways that we cannot yet imagine. 
Naval warfare began the day that man first took to the 
seas. The Phoenicians and the Greeks developed the first true 
warship, the trireme, in the 8th century B.C. It was powered 
by up to three banks of oars and featured a large ram as its 
primary means of disabling an opponent's vessel. Until the 
sixteenth century, ships were constrained by their 
seaworthiness, the number of men they could carry and the 
amount of supplies they could hold. They were primarily used 
to transport soldiers to the battle on land. Occasionally, 
fleets crossed each other's path and a naval "engagement" 
would ensue.• These battles, if they could be called that, 
were fought close to shore and were usually very bloody and 
short. 
As access to technology has increased and weapons have 
proliferated, lesser navies gained the ability to challenge 
•Jan s. Breemer, "Naval Strategy is Dead," u.s. Nayal 
Institute Proceedings 120 (February 1994): 49. 
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numerically and technologically superior fleets. During the 
Peloponnesian Wars, small boats manned by archers were used by 
the Syracusans to get to the rowers who powered the larger 
Athenian galleys. Syracusan galleys would have been no match 
for the Athenian vessels in a head-to-head confrontation but 
their innovative small boat tactics were successful. 
Similarly, the torpedo boat tactics of the Japanese Navy 
during the Russo-Japanese War allowed them to successfully 
engage and the larger Russian warships. 
The great revolu ons in modern naval warfare are well-
described by Bernard Brodie in his famous work, Sea P0wer in 
the Machine Age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941). 
The steam warship, iron-hull construction, armor and great 
ordnance, submarine warfare and naval aircraft were 
revolutionary inventions which fundamentally altered naval 
warfare. 5 Nuclear weapons and guided missiles have changed 
naval warfare even more since Brodie's book was published. 
These technological advances not only affected naval tactics 
and doctrine, they altered the global balance of power and 
determined which nation would dominate at sea. 
1. The steaa Warship 
James Watts' invention of the steam engine in 1763 was 
successfully mated to a wooden warship by John Rumsey in 1775. 
5 Bernard Brodie, sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1941), 10. 
7 
However, it was not unti 1 Robert Fulton's armored paddle 
steamer Oemologos was launched in 1814 that naval commanders 
were finally freed from their dependence on the wind. No 
other invention has so profoundly shaped warfare at sea than 
the invention of the steam engine. 
Prior to the invention of the steam engine, naval 
tactics had always been dictdted by the winds one encountered 
prior to engaging the enemy. Being on the windward side of 
your opponent was nearly always a tactical advantage. It 
allowed one to come down on a vessel to leeward; permitted an 
inferior ship to avoid a superior enemy; expedited a hasty 
retreat; and allowed for easier handling of deck guns. The 
advantage of the weather gage was one which was usually 
achieved quite by accident but one which dominated the tactics 
and doctrine of naval warfare until the mid-ninetee.1th 
century. 
As is often the case when a new technology first 
arrives on the scene, the great naval powers of the time, 
Great Britain and France, were slow to embrace steam-powered 
warships and incorporate them into their strategy, tactics and 
doctrine. Bureaucratic favoritism and reluctance caused the 
military and civilian authorities in both nations to move 
cautiously towards embracing this revolution in propulsion for 
naval warships. Both were slow to realize the full potential 
and the that this new technology held. The possibilities that 
8 
steam warships held were not fully appreciated and it was 
difficult for most to envision anything replacing the large, 
heavily gunned, sailing ships-of-the-line which had dominated 
naval warfare for four hundred years. 
2. Iron-Hulled warships 
The next great development in warfare at sea was the 
introduction of iron as a primary material in ship 
construction. An iron-hull offered four distinct advantage 
over their wooden brethren: 1) it allowed for the construction 
of much larger vessels, 2) it enabled a vessel to carry much 
heavier armor, 3) it made for a more stable gun platform and 
4) the cellular construction of iron ships made them much more 
capable of surviving damage. 6 With their powerplants now 
protected by armor and their screws beneath the water, a 
ship's captain could now pursue and aggressively engage the 
enemy without reluctance. 
Iron vessels had been used as canal boats and barges 
in Great Britain since 1787. In 1836, John Laird proposed 
building a warship out of iron but his idea was rejected by 
the British Admiralty. The first use of armor on a sea-going 
warship was in the French frigate La Gloire, commissioned in 
1859. She was a wooden-hulled, sail and steam-powered, screw-
propelled frigate and featured five inches of armor to protect 
6 Ibid., 157. 
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her wooden sides. She was capable of 13 knots, weighed 5,630 
tons and was outfitted with 16 guns. The British quickly 
followed suit with HMS Warrior, an armored frigate of some 
9,137 tons and a naval arms race to build iron-hulled fleets 
was on. 
However, it was the Americans, not the British or 
French, who foresaw the advantages of armor plating and were 
the first to exploit the new technology. This was due to the 
immediacy of the American Civil War. During the war, both the 
Union and the Confederacy built armored warships to battle 
each other along the eastern seaboard. The most famous of 
these encounters occurred at Hampton Roads, Virginia on March 
9, 1862. The css Virginia duelled with the North's Monitor in 
the first engagement between armored warships. Although the 
battle was indecisive, it was considered a strategic victory 
for the South since it threatened to delay the North's plan to 
invade the Yorktown peninsula. 
3. ~r and Great Ordnance 
The push and pull between the technologies of armor 
and ordnance would shape the course of naval warfare well into 
the turn of the century. Advances in armor plating were 
quickly countered by better and more powerful ordnance 
designed to defeat the armor. · The cycle repeated itself 
several times until gun technology finally overtook existing 
armor. By 1865 the armor-clad warship had shown that it was 
10 
not invincible at all: in fact it was slow, not very 
maneuverable and if superior firepower could be brought to 
bear against it, defeatable. 
The introduction of the French Paixhans gun in 1822 
added another dimension to the naval arms races of the times, 
more powerful and increasingly accurate naval guns. But change 
does not occur overnight and it was not until the American 
Civil War that the competition between armor and gunnery 
really took off. The Dahlgren guns of the North were a 
significant improvement over previous weapons but they were 
hardly decisive instruments of war when used in battle. 
The development in naval ordnance was like most 
advances in naval warfare in that it was not due to a 
technological breakthrough but rather a series of 
interconnected advances which combined to bring about a 
revolution in warfighting: modern naval gunnery. The first of 
these was Friedrich Krupp's introduction in 1851 of strong and 
lightweight gun tubes made of mild steel instead of cast-iron. 
When these guns were rifled and loaded with Joseph Whitworth's 
armor piercing projectiles, the result was a significant 
increase in accuracy and more than a threefold increase in 
range. Much greater muzzle velocities, and therefore 
penetrating ability, came about as a result of the invention 
of slow-burning powder in 1880. 
11 
In the course of thirty years, naval guns increased in 
maximum size from standard 68 pounders which weighed a mere 
five tons, to the British 16.25 inch behemoths which weighed 
a staggering 111 tons each. Armor had a difficult time 
keeping up with the rapid advances in ordnance, but keep pace 
it did. When HMS Warrior was built in 1861, she boasted a 
solid five inches of armor plate. Twenty years later, HMS 
Inflexible was outfitted with twenty-four inches protecting 
her vital turrets amidships, enough to protect her from any 
gun. In the next decade, however, advances in ordnance would 
end the tit-for-tat cancellation of tactical advantage with 
ordnance finally coming to dominate. With this, the era of 
the battleships had arrived. 
The first battleship was the HMS Devastation (1871). 
She is categorized as the first true battleship because she 
was the first warship to dispense with any traditional sail 
rigging and also the first to effectively incorporate a turret 
system for her guns. Despite these advances, accuracy 
remained an elusive goal for naval gunners and severely 
limited the effective range of the battleship's guns. The 
problem of accurate naval gunfire would not be solved for 
forty years until workable fire control systems were developed 
in 1912 by Captains scott and Simms for the British 
Dreadnought class of battleships • 
12 
The introduction of the battleship spurred a naval 
arms race that saw most nations with maritime interests 
acquiring this latest advanced warship. As the numbers of 
nations possessing warships increased, the great navies built 
larger and more capable battleships to maintain their 
dominance of the world's ~ea lanes. In 1850 a typical capital 
ship was a wooden-hulled ship-of-the-line of 3000 tons, 
boasting 100 ten inch guns with a range of 400 yards. By 
1890 a capital ship had developed into a 13,000 ton battleship 
capable of 18 knots. She was armed with six fourteen inch 
guns which had an effective range of ten miles. 7 Yet, the 
fear of losing prized battleships and cruisers drove the 
British and Germans to protect their fleets by keeping them in 
port throughout World War I. 
By World War II, battleships were the largest, most 
complex machines that mankind had ever built. The firepower 
that could be brought to bear by a single battleship made that 
of an entire fleet of warships from the mid-nineteenth century 
pale in comparison. It would take two subsequent 
technological developments to offset the tactical advantage 
that the battleship gave to the world's great fleets: the 
7 Kenneth Macksey, Technology in war: The Impact of Science 
on Weapon Development and Kodern Battle (New York: Prentice Hall 
Press, 1986), 78. 
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expansion of warfare to the depths of the oceans and the 
introduction of naval aircraft. 
4. Undersea Warfare 
History has shown that military inventions providing new 
means of attack or enhancing the strength of the defense 
are likely in the long run to be more or less adequately 
countered, albeit with great changes resulting in the 
forms and methods of war. But, if such inventions can be 
sprung by surprise during the course of the war, as the 
submarine for all practical purposes actually was, the 
advantage accruing from its use may very well decide the 
course of the conflict.• 
Just as the introduction of larger and more powerful 
guns had stimulated the development of protective measures for 
warships, advances in armor spurred the search for a means to 
defeat this protection. The answer was to attack the soft 
underbelly of the battleship using submarines, mines and 
torpedoes. All three had been in existence for decades, but 
it wasn't until the First World War that the technologies 
reached the point in their development where they could be 
employed in battle against capital ships. 
The advent of the submarine was the first 
revolutionary expansion of the physical realm in which naval 
warfare was conducted. Few who witnessed Sergeant Ezra Lee's 
inglorious first piloting of Bushnell's hand-propelled 
submarine, the Turtle in 1776, could have imagined the 
implications that it would have on warfare at sea. By 1800, 
•arodie, 308. 
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Robert Fulton had built his iron-clad submarine, the Nautilus, 
and the technologies of submarine construction and anti-
submarine warfare were inaugurated. 
Due to their short range, submarines were initially 
viewed as primarily defensive weapons which would be employed 
to conduct covert reconnaissance or at best, harassing attacks 
against an opponent. In the early 1900s, the French were 
shifting away from a defensive strategy towards one which 
emphasized the offense, and they therefore did not pursue an 
active submarine acquisition program. The British were 
engaged in a large naval arms race with the Germans but it was 
with capital ships, not submarines. Like most naval powers, 
the Germans placed little faith in a weapon which they felt 
was unproven in combat. 
Again, it was the American Civil War which proved to 
be the turning point for a new weapon system, in this case the 
submarine. The first submarine to fire a torpedo at an 
opponent, the Union's Alligator was designed specifically to 
go after the Confederate ironclad, Virginia. on February 17, 
1864 it was the Confederacy which scored the first success 
when css Hundley attacked and sunk the Union cruiser 
Housatonic in Charleston harbor. 
No one foresaw the impact that the submarine and 
torpedo would have on the First World War. Yet almost from 
its onset it became apparent that these weapons would forever 
15 
change the ways that navies operate. At the height of the u-
Boat war, 130,000 tons of Allied shipping was sunk every week. 
All told, 11 million tons would fall prey to the U-boats which 
would number 140 at their peak in 1917. 9 
The submarine, more than any other warship, maintains 
the initiative and freedom of action necessary to win at sea. 
It is an example of an inexpensive boat built in large numbers 
which uses stealth and a very capable weapon to attack. When 
aggressively employed, it is not only a very cost-effective 
weapon, it has very nearly been the decisive factor in the war 
at sea. In the 1950s, the launching of the ballistic missile 
submarine, uss George Washington, mated two technologies which 
would have vast repercussions for global security: nuclear-
powered submarines and ballistic missiles capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons against an opponent. 
Although it arrived too late for the war, the 
development of the first sonar (ASOIC) by a joint French and 
British team in 1918, signified the beginning of modern anti-
submarine warfare. This invention lead many in the Royal Navy 
to believe that the submarine was no longer a threat. The 
night-surface attacks and wolfpack tactics that Admiral 
Oonitz's U-Boats developed brought the British to a rude 
awakening. By the time the allies had relearned the lessons 
'Ibid., 332. 
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of World War I 1 the U-Boats had nearly severed Britain 1 s 
supply lines. 10 
While the submarine was the most visible and fearsome 
undersea weapon 1 other less technologically sophisticated 
weapons also had a tremendous impact on undersea warfare in 
the last century-and-a-half. The first practical naval mine 
was demonstrated by Samuel Colt whose stationary "torpedo" 
successfully blew up a 500 ton brigantine in 1843. The first 
use of mines as a defensive weapon occurred in 1849 at Kiel 
when a minefield was laid by the Prussians to forestall the 
Danish fleet. 11 
Mines represented a "crude, cheaper form of technology 
[which] had already imposed severe restrictions on an only 
slightly older 1 [more] sophisticated and expensive weapon 
systems. 1112 The Germans invented the delayed action mine in 
1917 and the British invented the magnetic influence mine in 
1918. These were examples of counter-technologies which were 
developed in response to advances in mine detection and 
sweeping. 
Mines were both used extensively during the two World 
Wars. During World War I, the Allies laid 172 1 000 mines and 
10Poirier 1 65. 
11Brodiel 269. 
12Ibid. , 60. 
17 
the Germans placed 43,600 around their harbors and in British 
waters. 13 over 25,000 mines were laid in and around Japan's 
coastal waters during World War II in an effort to blockade 
Japanese ports without using surface forces. Two million tons 
of Japanese shipping, one quarter of the merchant marine, was 
sunk by these mines, effectively sweep~ng Japanese merchant 
shipping from the oceans. u The Gulf War of 1991 further 
demonstrated just how effective these relatively 
unsophisticated weapons can be against a superior naval force. 
The first truly successful torpedoes were designed in 
1864 by an American, Robert Whitehead using Austrian Giovanni 
Luppis' techniques. By adding a compressed air propulsion 
unit to the charge of a mine, Whitehead was able to transform 
a defensive weapon, the mine, into an offensive weapon, the 
torpedo. When mated to a variety of delivery platforms, the 
torpedo became an effective means to take offensive action 
against an enemy's warships and commercial shipping. Unlike 
many other technological developments, the possibilities of 




•Charles w. Koburger, Jr., Narrow Seas. Small Nayies and 
Fat Merchantmen; Nayal Strategies for the 1990s (New York: 
Praeger, 1990), 89. 
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Delivering this new weapon against an enemy ship 
became the focus of naval research in the early twentieth 
century. Traditional wisdom had always been that ships of the 
same class fought each other, ie., to fight a battleship one 
needed a battleship. The invention of the torpedo-boat 
changed this premise: it was ·designed specifically to attack 
the enemy's largest warship. The British were the first to 
build vessels strictly designed to deliver this new weapon. 
The HMS Lightning was the first torpedo boat and signified the 
start of many nations' quest to obtain the capable little 
craft. By 1888 the Russian fleet already had 115 sea-going 
torpedo boats capable of 22 knots. 
The first limited use of torpedo boats in warfare 
occurred in the Prussian-Danish war of 1848-50 but it would be 
1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, before the first large-
scale torpedo boat attacks would be successfully launched 
against warships. At Port Arthur, Japanese torpedo attacks 
sunk a Russian cruiser and two battleships. Later in the war, 
the decisive battle in the Straits of Tsushima resulted in 
eight Russian battleships being sunk by superior gunfire and 
deadly attacks by fast torpedo boats. 
The torpedo boat demonstrated that a crude and 
relatively cheap combatant could inflict severe damage on 
large warships which were only slightly older and much more 
expensive and sophisticated. Today, torpedo and missile boats 
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remain the backbone for most of the navies of the developing 
world. 
The development of the submarine, naval mine and the 
torpedo knocked the traditional theories of sea control off 
kilter. Submarines were difficult to find, they fought alone 
and they had to be defeated one at a time . 15 They also 
transformed control of the seas into a truly multi-dimensional 
endeavor. Mines and torpedoes struck with little warning and 
they were difficult, if not impossible, to detect and counter. 
Naval strateqy and doctrine had traditionally focused on 
maneuver and the decisive battle at sea; it now had to 
consider campaigns of attrition. 
5. Naval Aviation 
As we have seen, the tactical possibilities of a new 
weapon are rarely appreciated by the military establishment. 
such was certainly the case of naval aviation. The French 
were the first military to recognize the potentials that 
flight brought to the battlefield. Francois de Rozier's 
balloon had given the French the tactical advantage of 
airspace in 1783 and they successfully employed it for the 
first time at the Battle of Fleurus in 1794. 
The United States Navy, was responsible for 
shepherding the next breakthrough in aviation toward a defined 
15Breemer, 50. 
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military application. In 1903, orville and Wilbur Wright had 
perfected the first lightweight, internal combustion engine 
which burned liquid fuel and was capable of being mounted on 
an airframe. The u.s. Navy nurtured the airplane along and 
developed the first plans for its deployment in battle. The 
first military airplane was ordered in 1907 and delivered two 
years later by the Wright brothers. Less than two years later 
the United States Navy had successfully launched an airplane 
from a modified warship and in 1912 Theodore Ellyson made the 
first shipboard landing. 
In that same year the first torpedo was dropped from 
the air by the Italians giving the airplane a decidedly 
offensive mission. Originally conceived as a useful tool for 
conducting scouting and gunfire spotting, the airplane had in 
eight short years expanded the area that fleets could observe 
each other and given them a new means by which to attack each 
other. It was the first weapon which crossed the boundary 
between land and the sea. It also opened up the prospect of 
a nation challenging for control of the seas without having a 
navy of its own. 
Yet despite its obvious potential and the u.s. Navy's 
stewardship, the airplane d~d not immediately revolutionalize 
naval warfare and make the capital ships of the time obsolete. 
The debate between those that favored the battleship and those 
who saw the great promise that aviation possessed was fie.rce 
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and is so often the case in modern naval warfare, tactics 
lagged well behind technology. 
Tactically, aircraft had always been hindered by poor 
endurance, insuffh:ient range and limited carrying capability. 
In 1915 the British had experimented with seaplanes dropping 
bombs against German and Turkish ships in the Dardanelles. 
During the First World War, Germany made several unsuccessful 
attempts to bomb allied shipping. Beginning in 1919, the 
United states Marine Corps began to explore the possibilities 
of mating a bomb to an airplane. By attacking from a near 
vertical dive, the Marines were able to lessen the effects of 
wind drift on a bomb drop and to defeat the heavy side armor 
which protected the battleship's turrets and valuab!e 
midships. 
However, dive bombing remained at best, an inefficient 
way of delivering ordnance on target. While the techniques 
that the Marines developed were important developments for 
naval aviation, dropping a bomb on a moving warship was 
inherently difficult and inaccurate. During the interwar 
period, several experiments were conducted with torpedoes 
launched from aircraft against warships. It would be 1931 
before the Japanese perfected the techniques necessary to 
accurately drop a torpedo from the air and 1941 before the 
Mi tsubishi A6M Zero and the Type 31 torpedo completed the 
first torpedo-bomber package for the Japanese. During World 
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war II, a torpedo dropped from a very shallow dive angle 
proved to be the weapon and tactic of choice for offensive air 
operations against warships. 
World War II and the advent of the aircraft carrier 
would transform the airplane into a dominant force at sea. 
surprisingly, it was a slow, heavy biplane which conducted the 
first successful carrier-launched torpedo attack against 
surface ships during World War II. On November 11, 1940 
twelve British Swordfish biplanes were launched from an 
aircraft carrier and successfully dropped eleven torpedoes on 
three Italian battleships in Tarento, scoring six hits. Five 
years later, the nature of naval warfare had been overturned. 
By the end of the war, carrier-based aviation was the 
dominant weapon at sea. The success of the aircraft carrier 
to attack out to 200 miles during the famous sea battles of 
World War II (Philippine Sea, Midway, Coral Sea} signified the 
end of the battleship's tenure as the capital ship of the 
world's great navies. Modern air superiority and power 
projection concepts were developed during the carrier battles 
of the war in the Pacific and the eventual attacks against 
land targets in Japan. Once proven in battle, it became clear 
that the aircraft carrier had permanently altered the tactics 
and doctrine of naval warfare. 
The aircraft carrier has since permitted American 
influence to be projected from the sea with an increasingly 
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powerful and accurate amount of firepower. Carriers represent 
a technological advantage that cannot be countered by most 
nations. However, they may be deterred by the threat or use 
of weapons which raise the costs of war to unacceptable levels 
for the United States. Today, a vast array of defensive 
measures is necessary to · defend the carrier against 
submarines, mines, aircraft and shore-launched missiles. It 
remains to be seen whether the aircraft carrier will remain 
the cornerstone of the United states Navy in the next century 
but at this point there is no clear alternative. 
6. Nuclear weapons 
The end of World War II and the dawn of the Cold War 
brought about a reevaluation of strategy, tactics and doctrine 
within the u.s. Navy. Since the Soviet Union had no Navy to 
speak of, it seemed relatively immune to naval pressure and it 
possessed the atomic bomb. The Navy's response was to devise 
a strategy which combined the atomic bomb, the aircraft 
carrier and naval aircraft and focused them on strategic nodes 
within the Soviet Union. This new strategy still had a 
maritime flavor., nuclear strike targets were largely composed 
of ports, shipyards and repair facilities. 16 
over the years, the Navy's role in the national 
security equation has been reassessed on several occasions. 
16Ibid., 51. 
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In the 1950s, the strategic land attack mission was delegated 
to the U.S. Air Force. As the Soviet Navy developed into a 
legitimate fighting force in the 1960s, sea control once again 
became the Navy's primary area of concern. In the 1980s, the 
Navy's Maritime Strategy emphasized forward operations and 
offensive carrier strikes against the Soviet Navy and its 
bases in an effort to contribute to the war on the central 
front. Naval aviation was reoriented once again towards power 
projection and airspace dominance. Defense and survival 
became important considerations for u.s. Naval planners. 
The conflicts which the United States Navy may be 
called on to become involved in over the next twenty years 
depart from this view of naval warfare. The opponents which 
the Navy will face may now be equipped with much the same 
weapons and technologies which have been the exclusive 
advantage of the great navies. Our ability to influence 
events in the littoral regions may be restricted by even the 
smallest navies. In fact, our ability to even approach 
coastal waters, let alone blockade and control them, may be 
impaired by the threat or limited use of weapons of mass 
destruction. History certainly contains many untoward 
examples of a superior opponent being held at bay by an 
inferior adversary who possesse·s the means to mask or subvert 
the superior's strategic and tactical advantage. 
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7. The Missile Age 
In October of 1967, two Egyptian fast attack craft 
fired four surface-to-surface missiles at the 2500 ton Israeli 
destroyer Eilat, sinking her in a matter of seconds. Naval 
warfare had entered a new age, one in which the guided missile 
and its small mobile launch platforms, missile boats and 
aircraft, would come to dominate the tactics of warfare at 
sea. 
The first recorded use of missiles at sea occurred in 
1780 when Hyder Ali of Mysore fired rockets at anchored 
British warships in India •17 The propulsion and guidance 
technologies which the Germans developed in World war II for 
their V-1 and V-2 flying bombs was refined and perfected 
during the Cold War to become the dominant naval weapon today. 
By the early 1970s, the Israeli Navy had adopted the 
guided missile as its primary naval weapon. Unlike Egypt and 
Syria, however, it had also developed a cohesive combat 
doctrine which incorporated the Israeli Air Force and its 
electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. During the Yom Kippur 
War, two naval battles were fought, one near Latakia and the 
other off Damietta, at the mouth of the Nile. Thirteen 
Israeli missile boats, armed with Gabriel radar-guided 
missiles with a range of 13 miles, took on 14 Egyptian and 
17Macksey, 9 • 
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Syrian boats equipped with styx missiles which were good out 
to 30 miles. Despite a two-fold advantage in missile range, 
the Arabs were decisively routed by the Israelis who managed 
to sink eight of the Arab boats without incurring a single 
loss of their own. Of the 56 Styx missiles fired at the 
Israelis, none scored a successful hit. 1 • 
The Falklands Islands War in 1982 was a prototype of 
the nature of 1 i ttoral warfare which " ••• From the Sea" 
envisions. During the war, eleven of the twenty-seven British 
warships dispatched to the area were damaged or sunk by 
Argentinian pilots firing French-made Exocet missiles and 
dropping bombs. Although the British fleet was not defeated, 
it suffered severely, especially when defending the amphibious 
landing at san Carlos. 
B. TBCHMOLOGY, THREATS AMD HAVAL DOCTRIHE 
In the narrow seas, modern technology-especially that 
concerning shore-based air power, fast attack craft, 
submarines, missiles and mines-can achieve sea denial 
without requiring superior naval forces. 19 
Two kinds of revolutionary change have historically 
altered the ways that navies think about their roles and 
functions. In his nomograph, "The End of Naval Strategy: 
Revolutionary Change and the Future of American Naval Power 
(Strategic Review, vol. 22 Spring 1994: 40-53), Or. Jan s. 
18Koburger, 6 5 • 
19Ibid. , XV. 
27 
Breemer points to technological innovation and a change in the 
external security environment as the triggers which change the 
direction and focus of a nation's naval doctrine. 
Technological innovations tend to cause a "bottoms up" 
response which seeks to make minor adjustments to doctrine and 
tactics in order to accommodate the new technology. When the 
external security environment changes, a "top-down" revolution 
occurs. 
Historically, military organizations have been hesitant to 
adopt new technologies for a variety of reasons. Barry Posen 
points out several in his work, The Sources of Military 
Doctrine; France. Britain and Germany Between the World Wars 
C Ithaca; cornell University Press. 1984) . One problem is the 
adaptation of new technologies to an existing military 
doctrine. Posen also notes that it is difficult to realize 
the potentials of a new technology until it is tested in 
battle; innovation increases operation uncertainty within an 
organization and is therefore resisted; and it is difficult to 
change military doctrine as a result of an untested 
technological innovation. 
The first great technological advance in modern naval 
warfare, the steam engine, encountered all of Posen's 
phenomena. Originally, steamships were viewed as being 
valuable only for scouting and harassment. A small steam-
powered ship could penetrate in close to a heavily armed 
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sailing ship, inflict damaging fire and retreat from action 
without due regard for the wind. Yet the idea of steam-
powered ships replacing sailing ships, with their large 
batteries, as the capital ships of the time, was not a 
position which enjoyed widespread acceptance. Once accepted 
by the world's great navies, developing the tactics to 
effectively utilize the new ships was the subject of much 
debate and little consensus. 
Despite the opposition, it became clear that steam was the 
power source of the future for naval warships. As steam-
powered warships grew in size and in the amount of weaponry 
that they were able to bring to battle, the value of the 
sailing ship waned. The attributes of speed and 
maneuverability replaced size and firepower as being the 
defining qualities of a naval warship. Seamanship, long 
viewed as the decisive factor in battle, took on less 
significance with the age of the steam warship. The tenets of 
warfare under sail were reevaluated and new doctrine and 
tactics had to be formulated to account for the new 
technology. 
Naval doctrine has also traditionally been based on the 
application of historical experience to the existing threats 
and conditions. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the u.s. 
Navy has consistently faced an identifiable adversary that 
threatened to challenge our mastery of the seas. our force 
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structure, training and doctrine were all designed to contend 
with this threat to the external security environment. The 
Royal Navy, the Imperial Japanese Navy, the Imperial German 
Navy and the soviet Navy all presented well defined threats to 
our national interests. 20 
Seapower, in the traditional sense, is the ability to 
influence events on the sea and from the sea. Historically, 
this has always meant large, blue water navies which 
blockaded, patrolled, and fought decisive battles with the 
best weapons and technologies available to them at the time. 
Modern naval doctrine developed from the classic sea power 
theories of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. His writings 
emphasize a strategy that centered on the clash of great 
battle fleets fighting for sea control and naval supremacy. 
Technological advances in naval warfare have traditionally 
focused on improving the warfighting potential of existing 
platforms to achieve this vision. Doctrine and tactics have 
evolved after the introduction of the new technology to the 
fleet. 
The absence of a serious blue-water threat today and the 
proliferation of sophisticated and increasingly lethal weapon 
systems by the world's lesser navies has largely superseded 
this proposition. The navies of the world's regional powers 
20Poirier, 63. 
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are not designed to take on the u.s. Navy in a head-to-head 
clash. Instead, they are designed to delay outside 
intervention and to make it potentially very costly for the 
United States to become involved. The U.S. Navy was not 
designed to deal with small boat attacks, mine warfare and the 
threat of quiet diesel submarines. 
Today, we are experiencing a concurrent revolution in the 
technology of naval warfare and a continuously changing threat 
dynamic. It is a time when we face a largely unknown future, 
making changes in doctrine difficult to articulate. This 
situation is very similar to the one which the Union Navy 
faced during the Civil War. It had presumptive sea control 
and the South, rather than challenging the North's superiority 
opted to harden key littoral areas such as Charleston harbor, 
New Orleans and the Mouth of the Mississippi River. They also 
employed emerging technologies such as the mine, ironclads and 
shore-to-ship gunnery. 2~ Naval engagements of the Civil War 
were attempts by the Union Navy to overcome these defenses: 
amphibious operations were attempts to take those positions by 
inserting land forces. These were the first "joint" 
operations between the Navy and the Army: they were also the 
last until World War II. 
21Gary w. Anderson, (Lieutenant Colonel, USMC), "Beyond 
Mahan: Naval Doctrine in the Post-Cold War World." Marine Corps 
Gazette 76 (June 1992): 39. 
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The Navy's new doctrine " •.• From the Sea, " outlined in 
Chapter III, envisions the u.s. Navy operating in the littoral 
regions of the world, rapidly responding to crises and 
providing the maritime bridge for CONUS-based forces to gain 
access to the theater. Projecting power ashore will be 
contingent on our ability to control the battlespace of the 
littorals. We need to move beyond our Cold War doctrine, 
which emphasizes power projection, in order to meet any 
challenges to our presence in the littorals. It is imperative 
that the u.s. Navy develop and maintain a strong sea control 
capability if it is serious about executing the missions which 
" •.• From the Sea" envisions. 
C. SUIIIIARY 
Up to the present this [command of the sea] has been 
understood to mean that the fleet commanding the sea 
openly plies upon it and the beaten antagonist does not 
dare to leave his ports. Would this be so today? 
Instructions bearing on the subject counsel the victor to 
avoid night attack from the torpedo-boats of his 
antagonist •••• some seamen have become reconciled to this 
abnormality, yet if the matter were represented to a 
stranger he would be astonished. He would probably ask 
whether he properly understood that a victorious fleet 
should protect itself from the remnant of a vanquished 
enemy •22 
As we approach the 21st century, the Navy is faced with 
three inevitable trends: precipitously decreasing funding, the 
22Sergei o. Makarov, (Vice Admiral, Russian Navy), 
Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics. Translated by 
Lieutenant John B. Bernadou (USN). ONI, part 2, General 
Information Series, no. 17. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1898. 
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ever-expanding capabilities of many Third World militaries and 
a revolution in our own military affairs and technical 
capabilities which will revolutionalize the ways that America 
wages war. We need to be proactive not reactive in our 
approach to the future. This requires a Navy-wide mind-set 
that the world is changing very rapidly, that the future of 
the Navy may very well be at stake and that we need to rapidly 
transform ourselves if we hope to survive.a3 
Today, a tidal wave of discoveries and inventions is 
changing the ways that we interact, as individuals and as 
states, in peace and during war. Technologies are evolving so 
rapidly that it is impossible to know which sorts of 
industrial capabilities will be most crucial twenty years from 
now. This revolution in technology will transform the Navy in 
the same way that the steam engine, the battleship and nuclear 
weapons have. The primary difference will be that the changes 
will occur at a much faster rate, requiring us to alter our 
doctrine and tactics at a sometimes uncomfortable pace in 
order to cope with the evolving threat. 
uJohn L. Petersen, "Plan for the 21st Century Now," ~ 
Nayal Institute Proceedings 117 (August 1991): 54. 
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III. • ••• FROM THE SEA• 
Wrapped around the principles of deterrence, forward 
positioning of forces and coalition operations with our 
allies, our strategy has come to recognize, once again, 
the necessity for a maritime nation to control vital sea 
lines of communication through naval superiority.z• 
As the world struggles towards the twenty-first century, 
many nations are discovering that they have been freed from 
the constraints which the struggle between the United States 
and the Soviet Union imposed on international relations during 
the Cold War. Certain nations, such as India, Iran and China, 
have made it clear that they intend to pursue plans which will 
establish them as regional powers. While perhaps not 
interested in openly challenging the United States, they do 
have very specific regional goals and ambitions which may 
bring them into conflict with the United States. Other 
nations, such as Cuba and Libya, will continue to be thorns in 
America's side and the plethora of lesser crises which 
continue to spring up around the world shows little sign of 
abating. Many nations simply wish to be left to sort out 
their problems for themselves when crises arise. 
24P.X. Kelly, (General, USMC) I "The Amphibious Warfare 
Strategy," u.s. Nayal Institute Proceedings 112 (February 1986): 
24. 
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In order to cope with these changes in the world's 
strategic landscape, our military has struggled to adapt its 
Cold War systems and methods of operation to fit the new, and 
constantly evolving threat. The United States Navy has sought 
to bridge this gap with " ... From the Sea, .. a document which 
seeks to define a combined vision for the Navy and Marir.c! 
Corps. "5 The purpose of this chapter is to analyze " ... From 
the Sea," and examine its applicability in a world where 
technology diffusion and the proliferation of advanced 
weaponry will permit the world's lesser navies to challenge 
the United States Navy. 
To provide the necessary background for " .•. From the Sea, " 
the concept of gunboat diplomacy, in all its manifestations 
(forward naval presence, reactive crisis response and precise 
power projection) is developed in the first section of the 
chapter. Unfortunately, the ambiguous nature and 
indeterminate results of gunboat diplomacy (success is usually 
measured by "non-events") makes quantification difficult. 
There are, however, historical examples of lesser navies 
deterring and, in some cases defeating superior navies in the 
restricted waters of the l~ttorals. These are included where 
applicable in the hope of offering some insight into the 
"
5
" ••• From the Sea , " 1 • 
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dangers which the United States Navy may when conducting the 
operations envisioned in " ... From the Sea." 
In the second part of the chapter " ••• From the Sea" is 
analyzed with the explicit purpose of exploring ways in which 
the u.s Navy may be defeated or deterred. In the fut._re, 
other nations may seek to deter the United States from 
involvement in their affairs by challenging our presence in 
their territorial waters. Given our intolerance of 
casualities, the lack of a well-defined threat and a 
hesitation to become involved in areas where our national 
interests are not directly threatened, an opponent may 
conclude that it is P.OSsible to deter the United States from 
intervention. our experiences in Beirut, Somalia and Haiti 
would appear to indicate that in some cases, an early, well-
planned attack against an arriving u.s. military asset may, 
rather than stiffen our resolve, lead to a u.s. withdrawal. 
But " ••• From the Sea" by itself is not enough; in order to 
maintain our dominance at sea, the tools that we bring to the 
fight and the ways that we operate must change; 
Unfortunately, the Navy's current procurement strategies 
appear to be aimed at continuing to i~prove our power 
projection capability rather than establishing battlespace 
dominance in the littorals. New ships and aircraft, as well 
as innovative uses for existing systems, are necessary if we 
hope to control the battlespace in the littorals, deter 
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aggression against us and, when deterrence fails, quickly and 
decisively defeat the enemy at minimum cost to our own forces. 
Recommendations are made in Chapter IV. 
A. DIPLOMACY, PRBSBifCE AJID CRISIS RESPONSE 
Despite recent isolationist calls, the United States will 
continue to remain actively engaged and our military forces 
will continue to respond to crises around the world. However, 
the technological asymmetry of military forces which we have 
favorably acted under during the Cold War era is narrowing 
giving other nations the ability to openly challenge the u.s. 
military should they choose to do so. This is particularly 
important for the u.s. Navy, usually first on-scene, which may 
be the initial target of direct challenges to our presence in 
an area. The world wide procurement of naval weapon systems 
outlined in Chapter IV would appear to have this capability as 
its ultimate goal. 
1. Gunboat Diplo~~acy 
Being forward-deployed has consistently allowed the 
u.s. Navy to be the first on-scene in responding to crises as 
they have emerged on the world stage. Between 1946 and 1989, 
in two hundred and forty instances of American military force 
being employed, the u.s. Navy has been the principle element 
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of our response in over 80% of the crises. 26 By comparison, 
the Air Force participated in 29% and the Army was involved in 
18%. 37 Despite the naysayers' assertions, naval forces and 
gunboat diplomacy will continue to be America's most likely 
initial response to regional crises as they emerge in the 
twenty-first century. 
Gunboat diplomacy is defined as the demonstration, 
threat or use of limited naval force for political 
objectives.a• The literature on gunboat diplomacy indicates 
that the most effective use of naval forces occurs when a 
definitive, deterrent display of force is used by an attacker 
who has engaged in war in the defender's region and who is 
militarily prepared and politically stable compared to the 
defender. 39 The ability of a Navy to coerce an opponent by the 
threat or use of overwhelming force has been the bread and 
butter of every great maritime power and will continue to be 
so in the 21st century. 
36Adam B. Siegel, u.s. Nayy Crisis Response Activity (1946-
1989); Preliminary Report (Washington, DC; Center for Naval 
Analyses, 1989), 4. 
37Scott c. Truver and James A. Hazlett, (Commander, USN) 
"Surfacing a New Battle Group," u.s. Nayal Institute Proceedings 
117 (April 1991}; 84. 
38Robert Mandel, "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy." 
International Studies Quarterly 30 (March 1986); 59. 
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After fading from favor in the 1970s, offensive 
gunboat diplomacy was revived in the 1980s by the Reagan and 
Bush administrations which demonstrated a preference for the 
limited use of military force in regional conflicts. The 
United States Navy was the primary instrument of this force in 
operations in Lebanon (1983),'Grenada (1983), Libya (1986) and 
the Persian Gulf ( 1987-88 and 1990-91). In addition, the 
Navy's Freedom of Navigation exercises, an intrusive program 
aimed at ensuring the right of safe passage, has aggressively 
challenged maritime claims on over forty occasions since 
1980. 30 Many of the lesser conflicts of the twenty-first 
century may not be readily addressed by sailing a carrier into 
a region and rattling our sabers. Tailored joint force 
packages may be a much better response to these types of 
crises. 
2. Forward Maval Presence 
The United States has traditionally sized its military 
forces based on the perceived threat to its national 
interests. However, naval forces often find themselves 
conducting missions which they are not well prepared for and 
are not sufficiently equipped to perform. During the 1990s 
the Navy has been used to protect Kurdish refugees in Iraq 
(Operation Southern Watch): to enforce the embargo on Haiti: 
30Eric H. Arnett, Gunboat Diplomacy and the Bomb; Nuclear 
Proliferation and the u.s. Nayy. (New York; Praeger, 1989), 1. 
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to maintain a ready force off Bosnia-Herzogovina (Operation 
Provide Promise); to ferry relief supplies to Somalia 
(Operation Restore Hope) and Bangladesh (Operation Sea Angel) : 
and tC' rform maritime intercept missions in the Persian 
Gulf, Auriatic and Red Seas. These operations demonstrate the 
necessity of a timely response that forward deployed, naval 
presence provides. 
The primary purpose of naval presence is to promote 
and defend American national interests by offering the promise 
of crisis diffusion and control before it escalates to the 
point where it is unmanageable. In addition, naval presence 
provides several other important functions in our 
international relations: support for acknowledged military and 
political commitments between the US and its allies; 
capability to move and act in support of unilateral or shared 
interests; the ability to assert American interest in regional 
conflicts without direct involvement; the ability to manifest 
credible warfighting capabilities during times of rising 
tensions: dispersal of humanitarian aid; and the ability to 
coerce an opponent to comply with some preferred course of 
action. 
Naval presence helps fulfill these missions by 
contributing to two important· strategic goals: extended-
general deterrence and 
Extended-general deterrence 
extended-immediate deterrence. 
is defined as the threat of 
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military retaliation against another state in an attempt to 
prevent that state from taking military action against an 
ally.n Extended-immediate deterrence applies the same 
principles but on a much more immediate basis 1 ie. 1 the 
mobilization of military forces along a nation's border. In 
certain crises, the mere presence of an American battle group 
in the area has helped reduce the tension between adversaries 
before the situation races out of control. The India-Pakistan 
War of 1971 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 are examples of the 
effect that American naval presence can have on a crisis that 
may have global conotations. 
In lesser conflicts which did not immediately threaten 
American interests, naval presence has also been used to 
signal the interest and resolve of the United States. The 
usual outcome has been an attenuation of the crisis, a return 
to normalcy and noninvolvement on the part of the Navy. It 
was generally a low-risk strategy because the immediate risk 
to u.s. naval forces was minimal. The containment of crises 
in Lebanon (1958 and 1982), Thailand (1962), the Dominican 
Republic (1965) and Jordan (1970) 32 are examples of this type 
of reactive naval presence. 
31Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of 
~- (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 16. 
32James F. McNulty, (Commander, USN), "Naval Presence: The 
Misunderstood Mission," Nayal war College Review (Summer 1974): 
26. 
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The Navy has maintained a global American presence 
with high levels of success since the end of World War II, 
fostering good relations with our allies and showing resolve 
to our enemies. Despite the best work of our intelligence 
community, however, many serious crises have erupted with very 
little warning. Naval forces had been on patrol in the 
Persian Gulf since 1949 yet our presence did not deter Saddam 
Hussein from invading Kuwait in August of 1990. In this type 
of short-notice crisis, forward deployed American naval forces 
will be first on-scene to provide a range of escalation 
control characteristics and warfighting capabilities which 
other forces lack. If deterrence fails, naval expeditionary 
forces are a credible, combat ready force that can be used to 
handle a variety of crisis situations. 
3. crisis Response 
Naval forces provide the National Command Authority 
with a wide range of crisis management options for handling 
lesser conflicts, most of which have the distinct advantage of 
being easily reversible. The movement of warships into an 
area conveys a certain sense of menace that is plausible to 
the opponent because it is a potent yet undefined threat. In 
addition, a naval force offshore provides an ongoing 
observation, communications and intelligence gathering asset 
in the region. 
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The chief advantage that naval forces provide for 
crisis management is their relative independence from fixed 
foreign bases and the political considerations that go along 
with the use of overseas bases. As we downsize and withdraw 
from many of our overseas bases, this autonomy will become 
increasingly important. Naval forces may also be quickly 
withdrawn if necessary and are nearly self-sustaining. They 
are usually at a higher state of readiness than land forces 
ind their character can easily be shifted from one of peaceful 
intent to one of high violence. Aircraft carriers, tactical 
aircraft and cruise missiles all represent an impressive and 
useful demonstration of a naval force's capabilities in the 
event that deterrence fails and coercion becomes necessary. 
However, naval forces also have certain weaknesses 
which need to be considered for crisis management. Land 
forces tend to show more resolve on the part of the deploying 
nation because of their real costs and the difficulty by which 
they are withdrawn. The flexibility of naval forces may be 
interpreted as a source of weakness by an opponent. Foreign 
leaders are also aware that ships can easily be withdrawn and 
may or may not indicate a high level of commitment on the part 
of the United States. The inherent uncertainty which makes 
naval warships attractive in the first place may also 
destabilize or escalate a crisis. In the case of extended 
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deterrence during an immediate crisis, warships may lead to 
expanded and unrealistic expectations by our allies. 
In the future, the Navy will face new challenges when 
performing its traditional mission of crisis response. In 
order for naval ships to deter, it is generally acknowledged 
that they must come into view (and range) of an opponent's 
shore. Even when this occurs, a Third World leader's 
knowledge of an American warship's capabilities may be minimal 
and he may doubt our conviction to become involved. The 
utility of naval forces as a diplomatic tool quickly becomes 
marginal as an opponent gains the capability to attack the 
force. Witho•..tt the conviction to act, the influence that 
warships can exert may be limited; they may be little more 
than an attractive target of opportunity. 
Power projection requires mobility, flexibility and 
technology to mass strength against weakness. 33 
When armed intervention is necessary to bring about 
physical coercion, presence has failed and the problem has 
moved from the deterrent to the war-fighting end of the war 
fighting spectrum. 3 • For the United States Navy, this means 
delivering powerful, accurate and sustained firepower from the 
sea: offensive gunboat diplomacy. Projecting and sustaining 
high-intensity, precise offensive power against an enemy's 
33
" ••• From the Sea," 6. 
34McNul ty, 27. 
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center of gravity remains the core competency of the u.s. Navy 
and is at the center of modern American naval doctrine and 
procurement. This power projection capability comes from a 
variety of naval assets: aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, 
cruise missile-capable ships and submarines. 
While the deterrent effect of naval presence and the 
threat of air strikes or cruise missile attacks has been 
sufficient to contain most crises in the past, the utility of 
Naval power projection may be questioned in many of the 
regional, low intensity conflicts of the future. Naval 
airpower and cruise missiles work very well against modern 
states with good target sets. Against undeveloped states it 
is difficult to identify and target critical strategic nodes 
and concentrations of military forces. Regardless of the 
conflict, ground troops will still have to land ashore where 
they and their delivering forces may be exposed to risks and 
opposition which we have not encountered since World War II. 
4. Future Challenges 
In spite of our apparent successes, the results and 
measures of effectiveness of modern gunboat diplomacy must be 
considered within the framework that the Cold War imposed upon 
the belligerents. I would argue that the "non-events" which 
have constituted success in most of the cases since 1945, may 
be attributable to other determinants such as the fear of 
escalation by the superpowers and the vast numerical advantage 
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and technical superiority that the United states Navy enjoyed 
during the majority of the Cold War. 
With the exception of the Cuban missile crisis, post-
war gunboat diplomacy has not involved nations which possessed 
the means to inflict serious damage against the u.s. Navy. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to evaluate the impact that naval 
presence and gunboat diplomacy has really had since the 
perceptions of the affected foreign leaders, many of whom are 
now dead or no longer in power, must be ascertained. A 
leader's political and military decisions are made on the 
basis of many diverse inputs, only one of which is the 
presence of Americ~n warships off his shore. 
" ••. From the Sea" emphasizes that the Navy will 
operate in areas close to an enemy's shore, acting as the 
immediate on-scene commander while providing command, control 
and surveillance capabilities to the National Command 
Authority. By doing so, we may also represent an ideal target 
to an aggressor who has no interest in being deterred and is 
willing to take a chance by striking out against an American 
force off his shore. 
While there is little doubt that the United States 
Navy will continue to enjoy a large overall numerical 
superiority well into the next century, several navies of the 
developing world, most noteably India, Iran and China, are 
going through extensive periods of growth. The rapid 
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downsizing of our own military forces has severely tasked our 
ability to maintain a constant presence in many regions of the 
world. In the future, it may be difficult to quickly 
concentrate sufficient Naval forces should an enemy choose to 
assert their regional ambitions. The U.s. Navy may be 
deterred form involvement. The proliferation of modern naval 
weapon systems, sensor technologies and the addition of 
weapons of mass destruction to the equation, has certainly 
shifted the stakes of a confrontation upwards. 
B. • ••• FROM THE SEA• 
The end of the Cold War has removed the singular threat 
which sized American military forces and dictated their 
doctrine and training for the past fifty years. While the 
possibility of a global conflict between the United States and 
another superpower seems remote for at least the foreseeable 
future, American involvement in lesser crises appears to be on 
the rise. Changes in strategy have therefore tended to focus 
on regional, rather than global, threats. 
In response to the changing nature of these threats, 
serious attention is being devoted in the United states to 
examining assumptions like national identity and grand 
strategy. Likewise, our military's roles and missions and the 
materials and procurement strategies which equip it, are being 
critically analyzed and redefined. Many tenets of current 
American military doctrine, which was developed to meet the 
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challenges that the Soviet Union presented during the Cold 
War, may no longer be applicable for the types of regional 
crises which we envision facing in the future. As a result, 
a new National Military Strategy has emerged and military 
doctrine has been revised to reflect the changing focus of 
this strategy. 
The National Military Strategy, first articulated by 
President Bush in 1990 and currently embraced, somewhat 
reluctantly, by the Clinton administration, recognizes that 
our future operating environment will be shaped by four 
principal dangers: regional conflict; the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction; threats to democracy and reform; 
and economic competition. 35 In order to meet these threats, 
the defining elements of the National Military Strategy are: 
strategic deterrence and defense; powerful yet unobtrusive 
forward presence; extended and on-scene crisis response; and 
reconstitution in the event of a global conflict. 36 These four 
elements make up the fundamental tenets of current American 
military doctrine. 
35President of the United States, National Military Strategy 
of the Qnited state§. (Washington, DC: The White House, 1991), 1-
2. 
36Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military 
Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 1992), 6-8. 
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1. Joint Military Doctrine 
Military doctrine, the Lridge which links a nation's 
grand strategy to the tactics of the military professional, 
has by necessity, undergone a period of reevaluation and 
redesign. For the United States Navy, this period of self-
examination has produced " ... From the Sea," a rethinking of 
the Navy's missions and a revision of the ways that it will be 
employed. Originally cor.ceived in the fall of 1992, this 
document shifts the focus of naval operations from the blue-
water scenarios of the Cold War to the brown and green-water 
operations envisioneo in future regional crises. It 
represents a fundamental shift away from open-ocean 
warfighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from 
the sea. 37 It also explicitly states that the Navy can no 
longer afford to go it alone. Joint operations and coalition 
warfare are the military buzzwords of the 1990s and our force 
planning, training and concepts of operations are being 
restructured to reflect their importance. 
In contemplating the nature of future crises, " .•• From 
the Sea" accurately reflects the current Department of Defense 
planning guidance which establishes three difLerent levels of 
conflict for force sizing and planning purposes: MRCs (Major 
Regional Conflicts) , LRCs (Lesser Regional Conflicts) and LICs 
37
" ••• From the Sea , " 1 • 
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(Low Intensity Conflicts). A global conflict against an 
emergent superpower does not appear likely in the near-term 
future and is therefore addressed by the rather ambiguous 
concept of "reconstitution." 
Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) are large, sustained 
operations requiring significant assets from all of the 
military services. Korea, Vietnam and Desert Storm are good 
historical examples; the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is 
an example of a current crisis which could expand and threaten 
the security of an entire region. In an MRC, the Army and the 
Air Force will provide the majority of combat forces ashore 
while the carrier battle group will operate offshore, 
launching strikes but more importantly, keeping the sea lines 
of communication open through aggressive antiair, antisurface 
and antisubmarine warfare against the adversary. 3 • 
At the lower end of the conflict spectrum are Lesser 
Regional Conflicts (LRCs) and Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs). 
In these lesser conflicts, the Navy and Marine Corps will 
often be deployed in their traditional role of peacekeepers 
and crisis managers, projecting precise power from the sea 
when required. Expeditionary forces may still be required but 
the crisis can usually be successfully dealt with by the 
38Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. (Captain, USN Ret.), A Perspective on 
Joint Littoral Warfare. Paper presented for the Applied Physics 
Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University, (Februa1y 26, 1993), 4. 
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deployment of a limited naval force. Somalia, Haiti and 
Liberia are recent examples of this type of low-intensity 
crisis. 
2. Sea Control and Battlespace Do•inance 
" ••• From the 5ea" recognize the vital importance of 
naval and maritime capabilities to a strong national defense. 
Throughout history, sea power has often been the key component 
of victory when great powers have been challenged by lesser 
powers. The traditional capabilities that the u.s. Navy has 
provided (strategic deterrence, sealift, sea control and 
flexibility) remain relevant in today's regional versus global 
defense planning perspective. 
In order to execute these missions successfully, four 
operational capabilities of naval expeditionary forces are 
stressed in " ••• From the Sea": power projection; command, 
control and surveillance; force sustainment; and battlespace 
dominance. 39 How well we are able to demonstrate these 
capabilities will largely determine the future applicability 
of naval forces in American defense planning. 
Paramount among t~2 military threats which the United 
States may face must be the deterrence of nuclear attack on 
the continental United States or any of its forward-deployed 
forces or allies. Despite a decline from thirty-seven SSBNs 
~ ..... From the Sea," 5. 
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to the eighteen which the 1991 Base Force planning guidance 
calls for, the Navy appears to be well-suited and properly 
equipped to continue providing the critical sea-borne leg of 
the American strategic nuclear Triad. stealthy and 
autonomous, our SSBNs and the Trident D-5 ballistic missiles 
that they carry, represent a strong commitment to the goal of 
deterrence, the primary role of American military forces. 
In addition to maintaining the strategic nuclear 
deterrent that our ballistic missile submarines provide, 
" ••• From the Sea" recognizes strategic defense against enemy 
ballistic missiles as a priority. More than thirty nations 
now boast a ballistic missile capability and seven have used 
them in combat.•o In the future, naval assets will inevitably 
have to be placed within the missile radius of adversary 
states in order to conduct the missions envisioned in " •.• From 
the Sea." In some cases, naval assets will operate within 
confined harbors leaving them relatively vulnerable to a 
ballistic missile attack. The proliferation of ballistic 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction make the development 
of a viable Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) 
capability aboard our Aegis warships essential for protecting 
our land-based forces and achieving mission success. 
40John B. Wolfsthal, "The Proliferation of Ballistic 
Missiles," Arms Control Today 22 (April 1992): 28. 
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Projecting high-intensity, accurate firepower from the 
sea will remain the core competency of the u.s. Navy. The 
CJCS Global Force Presence requirements and the Bottom-Up 
Review (BUR) have combined to generate a naval force which 
should allow the Navy to adequately perform this mission well 
into the twenty-first century. 
Barring any major changes, the force structure which 
the Navy will be comprised of in FY99 will be: 331 ships with 
eleven active and one reserve aircraft carriers; eleven active 
air wings composed of 50 all weather strike aircraft; 55 
attack and 18 ballistic missile submarines; 114 surface 
combatants; eleven amphibious readiness groups and enough lift 
to transport 2. 5 Marine Expeditionary Battalions (MEBs). 41 our 
air wings will be centered around the F/A-18 aircraft and its 
precision-guided munitions. Surface combatants of tt.e Aegis 
and Arleigh Burke classes will provide the added punch of 
3, 162 Tomahawk missiles. 42 No force in the world could 
duplicate our capability to project power ashore for the 
foreseeable future. 
Two less glamorous, but equally important, factors are 
integral to the success of " ••. From the Sea:" logistics and 
•
1Leighton w. Smith, Jr., (Vice Admiral, USN), Force 2001; 
Shapina and sizing the Navy for the 21st century ••• a New 
Direction From the Sea. (Washington, PC: Department of the Navy, 
1993), 49. 
42Ibid. , 4 7 • 
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sustainability. In a Major Regional Conflict, heavy sealift 
ships will provide the maritime bridge that heavy forces will 
require to gain access to the conflict. The immediate 
infusion of troops and supplies will probably be airlifted 
into theater; 99.5% of the troops deployed during Desert Storm 
arrived by air. 43 However, during a long-term crisis, most 
supplies will have to come from the United States. During 
Operation Desert Storm, 95% of the bulk supplies and equipment 
transported into the Persian Gulf area were brought by ship. 
Virtually every element of the United States' sealift 
capability, 385 ships in all, was tasked during the war. 
Sealift, although much slower, provides a quantitative 
advantage: one modern container ship can carry as much as 150 
c-5 sorties. 44 
Mobile support forces, sustained sealift and 
prepositioned forces are the critical elements of the forward 
logistic support concept which " .•• From the Sea" requires. 
Twenty-five vessels: thirteen for the Maritime Pre-Positioning 
Forces ( MPFs) and twelve other preposi tioned cargo containers, 
make up the Afloat Pre-Positioning Force (APF). These sea-
based forces contain the equipment that the Marine Corps 
43Mark L. Hayes (Major, USMC), "Sealift: The Achilles' Heel 
of our National Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette 76 (November 
1992): 72. 
54 
requires during a surge deployment. Eight other roll-on/roll-
off, fast sealift ships (FSS) provide the balance of rapidly 
deployable heavy sealift assets. An additional 164 u.s. 
flagged merchant marine vessels are available for sealift duty 
during times of crisis.~ 
In the wake of the successful resupply of coalition 
forces during Desert storm, it is tempting to presume that 
USTranscom will be able to handle the supply challenges of the 
future. This, however, is a dangerous assumption. Many 
writers feel that our sealift capability is inadequate for 
handling the rapidly developing scenarios of the future. They 
point to an absence of opposition during the buildup for 
Desert storm and the existence of eight ports and thirty-two 
major airfields in Saudi Arabia as factors which were crucial 
to the ultimate success of the operation. outside of Europe, 
such a setup cannot be duplicated anywhere else in the world. 
GrO\ .. .Jd and air combat forces will conduct the majority 
of the offensive operations in a Major Regional conflict. 
The Navy's primary mission in an MRC will be to ensure the 
safe arrival of these heavy-lift ships, protecting them once 
they arrive and providing rapid, responsive transportation of 
supplies and equipment to the expeditionary units ashore. 
This will require absolute control of the sea lines of 
45Ibid., 74-75. 
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communication enroute and the littoral battlespace once in 
theater. 
In order to fully understand the nature of the 
problem, the dimensions of the battlespace need to be 
appreciated. Most supplies will have to be transported from 
the United States: during Desert Storm this meant 8,700 mile 
one-way trips for our CONUS-based heavy sealift ships. once 
in theater, the main body of the naval task force may remain 
up to a hundred miles offshore while elements operate along 
the enemy's shore and expeditionary units operate forty miles 
inland. These large transit distances and expansive areas of 
the littoral battlespace will pose a daunting sea control 
problem if our presence is actively challenged. 
Dominating the battlespace presupposes effective command 
and control capabilities and serves as the logical 
prerequisite for the projection of power ashore.•• 
An area where the Navy does not have a lot of recent 
experience is in the littorals: those areas of the world which 
are characterized by confined waters and congested airspace 
which is occupied by friends, enemies and neutrals. The 
operating environment of the littorals favors the opponent 
because he has a defensive advantage and an information edge. 
Our explicit knowledge of most of the coastal and littoral 
areas of the world is poor since maritime law limits our 
•• , ••• From the Sea," 5. 
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access to other nation's territorial waters. Conversely, an 
opponent will have intimate knowledge of the operating area, 
giving him the overall tactical advantage even when confronted 
by technologically superior forces. 
The key to " ••• From the Sea's" success wi 11 be the 
ability of the u.s. Navy to achieve battlespace dominance in 
the littoral regions of the world. Battlespace dominance is 
attained by detecting, targeting and destroying enemy forces 
that present a threat to our maneuver ashore.•7 It may also 
be achieved by taking preemptive action aimed at degrading the 
enemy's ability to conduct offensive operations. For the Navy 
this means aggressive anti-air, submarine and surface warfare, 
all prerequisites for conducting offensive operations against 
the enemy. The future relevance of naval forces may 
ultimately hinge on our ability to achieve this battlespace 
dominance of the littorals during times of crisis. 
"· •• From the Sea" views the Navy as a strategi 
enabler, however, operating in the littorals means shallow 
water and therefore slower speeds, restricted maneuverability, 
navigational hazards and the threat from shore-based and sea-
based weapons systems. Historically, the mere presence of a 
u.s battle group in an area was enough to deter opponents from 
•
7carl E. Mundy, (General, USMC) , "Getting It Right .•• From 
the Sea," ~s. Nayal Institute Proceedings 120 (January lq94): 
70. 
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attacking. However, given the proliferation of advanced naval 
weapon systems, the Navy may arrive on-scene with an 
unfavorable local balance of forces. In this situation, a 
limited probe by an opponent aimed at testing our resolve may 
be a very real possibility. 
C. DEFEATIIIG • ••• FROM THE SEA • 
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations of 
the world claim preeminent control of the seas and ensure 
freedom of commercial maritime presence.•• 
The u.s. Navy has historically been called upon to contain 
crises through forward operations and rapid response with 
flexible and sustainable sea-based forces. While continuing 
to stress these concepts, " ••• From the sea 11 somewhat naively 
assumes that the international respect for freedom of the seas 
will continue to permit American naval forces to gain access 
to the territorial waters of the world's nations. In today's 
world, casually cruising the coastlines of Third World 
adversaries during crisis situations only invites disaster. 
In the event of an attack against u.s. naval forces, it is 
not entirely clear what our response would be. Four factors 
have combined to weaken our ability to deter our adversaries: 
an intolerance of casualities; an unwillingness to commit 
sophisticated (and expensive) military assets in areas where 
our national interests are not directly threatened; the 
....... From the Sea, 11 2. 
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increasing influence of public opinion on American foreign 
policy: and the declining level of overseas presence which we 
are able to exercise. These four factors have combined to 
open a door which our adversaries may be willing to step 
through. 
1. Restrictions on Aaerican Foreign Policy 
The United states is ill-suited to fighting wars of 
attrition. Since the Vietnam War, a fear of escalating 
casualties has led to a reluctance on the part of Congress and 
the American public to support military operations in areas 
where our national interests are not directly threatened. 
once American naval forces are on-scene, our opponents, be 
they states or terrorists, may attempt to place forward-
deployed units at risk, hoping to intimidate us into 
withdrawing, thereby undermining our credibility and achieving 
their own political and military goals. 
Today, serious questions are being raised about the 
need to risk high-value assets and personnel in conflicts 
where our interests are marginal or poorly arti~ulated by our 
decision-makers. During the Cold War, the perceived 
importance of the stakes at hand drove our willingness to 
commit the financial and material resources necessary to win. 
In an all-out conflict with the Soviet Union taking risks with 
high-value assets was acceptable. In many of the low-
intensity conflicts of the future, it will become increasingly 
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difficult to justify risking an aircraft carrier ($4 billion), 
an Aegis cruiser ($1 billion) or even an F/A-18 ($45 million) 
to contain a crisis which has little significance to American 
national interests. Even when an attack comes, our response 
may well be to withdraw rather than risk further casualties 
and losses. 
Without the singular threat of Communism to justify 
the possibility of American casualties, recent public opinion 
polls indicate that Americans have a very low tolerance for 
casualties in low-intensity, regional conflicts. In areas 
where American interests are marginal, popular support for 
military missions vacillates and is directly related to the 
ease with which the mission is being conducted. Desert Storm 
was a major regional crisis and public opinion was carefully 
cultivated over a six month period. Tomorrow's crisis de jour 
will probably not give us the same luxury of preparation, from 
either a military or a public affairs perspective. While our 
political leaders may feel constrained by this consideration; 
our opponents may be inclined to take risks. 
The recent U.S./U.N. operation in Somalia is a good 
example of the American public's declining tolerance for even 
minimal casualties. In January 1993, President Bush ordered 
u.s. Marines ashore in response to the civil war and mass 
starvation that was occurring in Somalia. The President had 
resisted becoming involved for two years but the media images 
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of the situation became too much to ignore. over a twelve 
month period, a series of Time/CNN polls revealed the 
following public attitudes toward the operation.•• The 
question asked in all of the polls was, "Do you approve of the 




















*Margin of error ± 4% 
This series of polls indicated some interesting 
trends. Although there could be a variety of reasons for the 
results, the ease with which the u.s. Marines were able to 
come ashore unopposed and the immediate impact that they 
appeared to have on the situation certainly contributed to the 
upswing in public opinion in January 1993. Conversely, the 
disasterous October 1993 attack against u.s. Army Rangers in 
Mogadishu contributed to the quick erosion of public support 
for the operation. Congress and the President were quick to 
react to the sagging public support for the mission by 
announcing a March 31, 1994 pullout date shortly thereafter. 
••George c. Church, "Anatomy of a Disaster," fiB 142 (18 
October 1993): 42-50. 
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The rapid downsizing which the military is going 
through is also a restriction on American foreign policy 
because it will inevitably lead to a decline in our overseas 
presence. Seven hundred overseas bases will have closed by 
the year 2000. The 331 ships which the u.s. Navy will be left 
with in FY99 will increasingly be unable to provide year-round 
presence in various regions of the world. It is estimated 
that we will be unable to keep a carrier in the Mediterranean 
for more than six months of the year; in the Indian Ocean and 
Persian Gulf, this drops to five months in twelve.~ Despite 
the Air Force 1 s claims, it is doubtful that the forward 
presence role can be accomplished by CONUS-based bombers. our 
response to major regional conflicts is bound to suffer: by 
the time the u.s. Navy arrives on-scene, the crisis may well 
have become a fait accompli. 
2. Denial and Defedt 
Given these four conditions, and the future operations 
which " .•• From the Sea" envisions, deterring or defeating the 
u.s Navy may be achieved in one of two ways: 1) denying the 
Navy access to its territorial waters, thereby eliminating the 
threat that a naval battle group may pose or 2) threatening, 
or delivering, a knockout punch against a naval asset which 
causes the u.s. to withdraw from further conflict. 
~Jack Weible, "Future: Forward Absence?" Navy Times 2 May 
1994, 5. 
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In order to deter the United States, the Navy's 
domination of the sea lines of communication and littoral 
regions must be challenged or at least disputed. The threat 
of an attack would, if nothing else cause the United states to 
reassess its involvement. By testing the capabilities and 
resolve of the United States, an opponent shifts the decision 
to escalate to us 111hich, for a variety of reasons, may not be 
an option in areas where American national interests are 
marginal or ill-defined. This permits an opponent's strategy 
against the U.s. Navy to be one of denial rather than 
technological superiority. 
As long as the sea remains the primary avenue by which 
the United States transports its war supplies, denying us free 
access to the littorals will be a primary goal of our 
adversaries' defense planning. As previously stated, the 
objective of naval forces in MRCs will be to maintain control 
of the battlespace above, below and on the world's oceans. By 
doing so, the sea lines of communication are protected, 
supplies and personnel can be safely delivered and the ability 
to attack targets ashore and support amphibious operations is 
ensured. Challenging our right to free access, whether done 
with a minefield, overt attacks or the threat of a nuclear 
weapons, may permit an opponent to deter the u.s. Navy from 
accomplishing its primary mission in an MRC: ensuring the safe 
delivery of goods and supplies. In lesser conflicts, it may 
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simply not be worth risking the potential consequences of 
involvement. 
The Swiss military strategist, Antoine-Henri Jomini, 
postulated that there are certain principles of war which are 
timeless. Among these are the necessity of surprise and the 
ability to concentrate a severe blow against an opponent's 
decisive point. 51 This may be especially applicable in the 
types of limited, low-intensity warfare (LRCs and LICs) in 
which we may find ourselves. In these types of conflicts, 
large-scale prolonged casualties like the ones which we 
suffered in Vietnam, are clearly unjustifiable. Even moderate 
casual ties, such as those that we experienced in Beiru·t and 
Somalia may, rather than stiffening our resolve, cause the 
u.s. to reassess its involvement and ultimately lead to our 
withdrawal. 
A clever opponent will not try to match up evenly 
against the strengths of the u.s Navy; instead he will look to 
exploit our weaknesses, our "glass jaw. rr Many potential 
adversaries now believe that they will only have to get lucky 
once - perhaps a missile attack against a carrier or a single 
torpedo launched against a logistics supply ship - to raise 
the stakes high enough to break any coalition or cause enough 
domestic pressure on u.s. decision-makers to ·:emove our 
51 John Shy, HJomini," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. 
Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 182. 
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forces. As Somalia demonstrated, an adversary need not win a 
clear military victory to cause the United States to withdraw. 
A single, dramatic attack with immediate live media coverage, 
would likely be sufficient to send a clear message to the 
United states. 
The best military technology is not that which is 
superior; rather it is that which masks or neutralizes the 
other side's strengths, even as it exploits its 
weaknesses. 52 
Since World War II there have been several cases where 
an inferior navy has been able to inflict enough damage 
against elements of a superior fleet to deter or even defeat 
them. In 1946, two British destroyers were heavily damaged by 
Albania and the British withdrew; in 1949, the Chinese gunboat 
Amethyst successfully denied the British fleet access to the 
Yangtse River; on several occasions, Iceland's patrol boats 
have successfully asser.ted that nation's exclusive fishing 
rights against the British; in 1968 the North Korean Navy 
captured the USS Pueblo without suffering consequences; and in 
1977 the Argentine Navy fired on and detained nine Russian and 
Bulgarian trawlers on the high seas without repercussion. 53 
There is no doubt that had the defeated nation chosen 
to fully engage the antagonist, the superior navy would have 
5~artin van creveld, Technology and war (New York: The Free 
Press, 1989), 176. 
53Cable, 39. 
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easily prevailed. This was certainly the case of the 
Falklands War in 1982 when Britain chose not to be deterred 
from recapturing the Falklands from the Argentines. However 
in the aforementioned cases, an infP~~~~ force was able to 
strike a blow against a technologicaliy superior force which, 
for whatever reasons, was not countered. From the lesser 
navy's point of view, the best tactic against the superior 
navy was to deny it the liberty of using its territorial 
waters. If an opponent is able to instill a fear of the 
consequences in a naval commander's mind, deterrence may 
succeed. 
Today, technological difusion and the proliferation of 
both advanced conventional weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction will give more actors access to technologies which 
a decade ago were the sole province of the two superpowers. 
The extent of this threat is outlined in Chapter IV. Given 
our aversion to casualties, the lack of a singular threat to 
focus our energies on, the increasing influence of the media 
on foreign policy and a sharp decline in our overseas 
presence, the days when an attack against American military 
forces raised popular slogans like "Remember the Maine" and 
"Avenge Pearl Harbor" may be gone forever. 
D. SUIOIARY 
While " .•• From the Sea" may be a revolution in naval 
doctrine, it is not a fundamentally different approach for the 
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United States Navy. Instead, it merely articulates and 
codifies the types of operations that the United States Navy 
has been performing for years. However, the level of 
opposition and the sophistication of the threat have increased 
markedly. Success in future operations wi 11 largely depend on 
the Navy's ability to control the battlespace of the 
littorals. All other missions: surveillance, crisis 
management and power projection, are dependent on this 
dominance of the littoral battlespace. 
The modern u.s. Navy was built to meet and defeat the 
Soviet Union's Navy, to project power against the Sovi~t's 
Eurasian bases and to ensure the reinforcement and resupply of 
the European continent by sea. 54 Most of the capabilities 
which we have developed in the last fifty years are still 
applicable for dealing with future regional threats. However, 
we are deficient in certain areas, namely mine detection and 
countermeasures, shallow-water ASW, ballistic missile defense 
and protection against chemical and nuclear weapons. These 
weaknesses undermine our ability to dominate the battlespace 
of the littorals and may represent an achilles heel which an 
opponent will try to exploit. 
~Roger w. Barnett, (Captain, USN Ret.), "Regional Conflict 
Requires Naval Forces," u.s. Naval Institute Proceedings 118 
(June 1992): 31. 
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Despite these deficiencies, " ••• From the Sea" is exactly 
the type of doctrine that the u.s. Navy needs to transform 
itself from its previous Cold War orientation to an effective 
fighting force which is able to fight and win in the regional 
conflicts of the future. In any crisis, the arrival of U s. 
naval forces still sends a clear message of our interest. In 
the event that containment fails, our carrier and cruise 
missile firepower provide an impressive offensive and 
retaliatory strike capability. This potential use of force by 
the u.s. Navy will remain a critical tool in the practice of 
diplomacy and crisis management well into the twenty-first 
century. However, " ••. From the Sea" will remain a hollow 
doctrine unless we approach the future with innovation and 
creativity. The focus of future procurement strategies must 
be on achieving battlespace dominance in the littorals. 
Resting on our previous successes and relying on our 
superiority in power projection to achieve our goals is a 
recipe for disaster. 
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IV. THE THREAT 
Technological advances and the proliferation of 
sophisticated sensors, advanced conventional weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction have given inferior navies the 
ability to contest the power of a blue-water navy operating in 
the restricted waters of the littorals. It is a daunting 
challenge which requires new approaches to old problems if we 
are serious about maintaining our dominance at sea. 
Today, there are over sixty small but significant navies 
in the Third World, forty of whom now count some type of 
submarine in their inventories. Fifty militaries operate 
tactical aircraft which are capable of delivering antiship and 
cruise missiles against a surface ship. 55 Twenty-two nations 
have ballistic missiles capable of delivering various payloads 
and eight nations (United states, Russia, Ukraine, 
Khazakhstan, Belarus, France, Great Britain and China) are 
known to possess nuclear weapons. Five others are suspected 
of possessing limited numbers of crude weapons (India, 
Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and Iran) and others have 
developed nuclear weapons programs only to abandon them for 
one reason or another (South Africa, Iraq and Argentina). 
55Koburger, 2. 
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As the patterns of conflict change and the proliferation 
of high techr•ology weapons increases, American naval forces 
will be subjected to new risks. These threats come from the 
proliferation of traditional "naval" weapon systems as well as 
from other non-traditional systems and technologies. The U.s. 
Navy's new doctrine, " ••. From the Sea" promotes joint 
warfighting in the littoral regions of the world, an area in 
which the u.s. Navy does not have much recent experience. It 
exposes naval assets to new dangers which need to be 
considered prior to their commitment. 
While the possession of a weapon is not necesssarily 
indicative of one's intent nor one's capabilities, it is 
nonetheless useful to examine the procurement of certain 
weapon systems and to analyze the threat that they may present 
to the u.s. Navy and the operations described in " •.• From the 
Sea." In this chapter, the proliferation of sophisticated 
sensor technologies, advanced conventional naval weapon 
systems and weapons of mass Jestruction is presented. The 
data reflects the nature of the current threat that these 
weapons and technologies bring to the military equation. 
A. SENSOR TBCIIIfOLOGIBS 
The best military technology is not that which is 
superior: rather it is that wnich masks or neutralizes the 
other side's strengths, even as it exploits its 
weaknesses. 56 
Nvan Creveld, 176. 
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Real-time, accurate geographical information is critical 
for the precise targeting of modern weapon systems. Space-
based systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and 
reconnaissance aids (night-vision goggles, infrared target 
designators) are examples of systems which are rapidly 
leveling the playing field of modern naval warfare. 
Many different technologies are available to improve the 
tactical intelligence gathering capability of Third World 
militaries. The availability of information provided by two 
advanced sensor technologies: space-based intelligence systems 
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), allows greater access to 
the types of information which was at one time the sole domain 
of the United States and the Soviet Union. When combined with 
modern delivery systems, conventional weapons or weapons of 
mass destruction, these systems complete a deadly package 
which has enormous political and military value and is 
potentially threatening to a u.s. Naval force. 
1 • Space systeJIS 
Access to communications satellites and remote sensing 
imagery is nearly universal today. The data is used for 
mapping and land use management as well as monitoring global 
environmental change. In the developing world, nations are 
expanding their investments in space systems while funding for 
research and development has remained strong despite cuts in 
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many other military programs. one aspect of this otherwise 
benign use of space is the quest for real-time satellite 
imagery which can be used to target enemy forces and maintain 
surveillance during periods of tension. As has always been 
the case, the nation that possesses the best intelligence 
information is usually able to dictate the course and tempo of 
a military operation. 
With the advent of space-based intelligence systems, 
the United States and Russia gained a tremendous strategic and 
tactical advantage over all other nations. The United States 
currently operates five KH-11 and Lacrosse real-time photo 
imaging satellites and the Russians maintain three of their 
Cosmos type satellites at any one time. In addition, both 
nations operate up to six signals intelligence satellites in 
geosynchronous earth orbit. 57 These satellites provide real-
time communications monitoring to ground stations in their 
host countries. However, the dominance which the US and 
Russia have thus far been able to protect has recently been 
significantly reduced. 
Since the early 1970s, other nations have sought to 
develop their own satellite imagery programs with mixed 
results. The Chinese have put twelve military photo 
reconnaissance satellites into orbit since 1970. However they 
57Jeffrey Richelson, "The Future of Space Reconnaissance," 
Scientific 6merican 264 (January 1991), 40. 
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remain incapable of producing real-time photo imaging to 
ground stations. us intelligence sources believe that the 
Chinese are currently developing a more advanced system and 
may have already fielded the first of these new, more capable 
satellites. 
Israel began its own space program in 1988 by 
launching the Offreq 1 intelligence satellite in cooperation 
with South Africa. India is preparing to launch its Polar 
Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) in the near future which will 
enable it to increase its surveillance of long-term rivals 
Pakistan and China. The Indians have also confirmed that the 
PSLV satellite will be used to target its developmental 
intermediate-range ballistic missile, Agni.a• Great Britain, 
Germany and Japan are all in the final phases of development 
with space-based earth observation systems and Brazil, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran have the foundations of programs already well 
established. 
France too has developed a sophisticated network of 
satellite reconnaissance systems the centerpiece of which is 
the SPOT surveillance satellite. This satellite is able to 
produce black and white images which have 30 foot resolution 
and color images of 66 foot resolution. While this is only 
one-fifth of the resolution that American satellites are 
58Ibid. 1 44. 
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capable of, the images are good enough that the French 
military uses SPOT information for military intelligence. A 
French-Italian-spanish joint effort to develop a system of 
four photo reconnaissance satellites called Helios will 
provide imagery information which is on a par with the United 
States'. France has stated that it will use Helios 
information to target its strategic nuclear missiles. 59 
Until recently the resolution of satellite imagery 
outside of the United States and Russia was not sufficient to 
fulfill the intelligence requirements of most nations. 
However, this is no longer the case as resolution and access 
have dramatically increased. During the Gulf War, Iraq sought 
out and received French SPOT imagery of coalition force 
deployments. The French were willing to sell what they 
considered non-technical imagery to an opponent which they 
were actively involved against. The United States had to 
eventually threaten to knock down the SPOT satellite before 
the French would acquiesce and restrict Iraqi access to the 
information. As access to this type of information becomes 
easier to get and protecting it becomes more difficult, the 
tactical advantage that the United States has long enjoyed may 
lessen. 
59Ibid. I 43. 
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The negative implications of this proliferation of 
space-based imagery are numerous. The element of surprise in 
military operations will become more difficult to achieve as 
will the ability to prepare for war without detection. The 
United States and the Soviet Union were able to maintain a 
sense of transparency throughout the Cold War largely through 
the use of satellites. They were the only two players with 
access to the information and an uneasy stalemate resulted. 
With the advent of new satellite networks such as GPS and the 
Russian Glonass system, and increased access to the 
information that they provide, the comparative advantage that 
the superpowers once held can no longer be taken for granted. 
2. Unaanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
UAVs represent the low end of the intelligence sensor 
spectrum but they represent an affordable and capable 
alternative to space-based systems for some nations. UAVs 
represent an entirely new use for technology on the modern 
battlefield. Missions include reconnaissance, targeting, 
naval gunfire support, artillery adjustment, target 
designation, mine sweeping, close air support coordination, 
electronic warfare and battle damage assessment. 60 The depth 
of the battlefield can be greatly increased by using UAVs for 
targeting, up to BOO km in the most sophisticated systems. 
60Edmond Dantes, "Military Aviation," Asian Defense Journal 
12 (December 1992): 31. 
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With accurate targeting information, an enemy can be attacked 
by missile systems without risking tactical aircraft and their 
crews. 
The first use of UAVs was by the Israelis during their 
clash with Syrian forces in the Bekka Valley in 1982. Israeli 
UAVs were used as decoys to ·deceive the layered Syrian air 
defenses and to provide real-time intelligence and targeting 
information to the Israeli Air Force. The United States 
successfully employed UAVs in 1991 to monitor Iraqi forces in 
Kuwait and to conduct surveillance across the battlefield 
during Operation Desert storm. 
Canada, France, Britain and the United States are the 
recognized leaders in UAV development and production. Most 
western militaries have incorporated UAVs into their military 
doctrines but like all new technologies the rest of the world 
will not be far behind. Indigenous UAV programs also exist in 
India, China, South Korea, Japan and Australia. Singapore 
began a sort of mini arms race over UAVs w!1en they purchased 
an undisclosed number of Israeli Aircraft Industries Scout 
UAVs in 1989. Several other Asian nations followed suit 
shortly thereafter. 411 The utility of UAVs is obvious and their 
proliferation is something which is bound to increase now that 
the potential of the systems has been proven in combat. 
61Ibid. I 36. 
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B. COHVBII'TIONAL NAVAL WEAPOIIS 
In this section, five conventional naval weapon systems 
are presented: fast attack craft (FACs) and corvettes; diesel-
electric submarines; tactical aircraft: mines: and antiship 
and cruise missiles. They were chosen because they are the 
most widely proliferated conventional naval weapon systems and 
they represent the most likely type of challenge to an 
American naval battle group in many of the littoral reg1ons of 
the world. 
1. Fast Attack Craft and Corvettes 
The world's lesser navies have usually been discounted 
in American naval planning. They were usually poorly trained 
and equipped with outdated, low-tech weapons which could 
inflict little damage against a US Navy warship. Many nations 
of the world are no longer content with purchasing the 
decommissioned ships of the United States and Russia to 
perform the traditional naval functions of maritime presence, 
sea denial/sea control and deterrence. Increasingly, the 
platform of choice for Third World navies are highly 
sophisticated Fast Attack Craft (FACs) and corvettes. 
Despite the annihilation of the Iraqi Navy during the 
Gulf War, the proliferation of FACs and corvettes is 
increasing among the nations of the developing world. The 
fast attack craft (FAC) is a small, stealthy and highly 
maneuverable platform. These vessels can be outfitted with a 
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variety of guns as well as cargo rockets, surface-to-surface 
and surface-to-air missile systems. Most boats are between 
90-150 feet long and weigh between 150-300 tons. Several are 
capable of speeds in excess of thirty-five knots. 62 Their 
c:.:ews are small, usually less than thirty, and they are 
familiar with the coastal areas in which they work. FACs do 
not have a large ~adius of action but they do have good sea-
keeping ability and carry significant firepower. 
In addition to performing their primary mission of 
hit-and-run shipping strikes, FACs can also lay mines, conduct 
ASW operations, provide surveillance and spotting and 
electronic countermeasures. FACs can be camouflaged and 
hidden along a coastline making them virtually invisible t~ a 
ship's watchstarders and radar. Land-based radar and a data-
link provide the patrol craft with a good surface picture and 
allows it to work in cooperation with other vessels, aircraft 
and control systems. Many navies employ them in teams 
supported by a tender which provides supplies, fuel, 
ammunition an repair facilities. 
Most of the world's navies operate some type of FAC 
and more than sixty operate FACs capable of carrying antiship 
missiles. In the Asia-~~cific region, North Korea operates 
twenty-eight Russian supplied FACs and South Yorea counts ten 
62John Cordle, (Lieutenant, USN), "Welcome to our World," 
u.s. Nayal Institute Proce~dings 120 (March 1994): 63. 
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American built PSMMS class boats. Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and Thailand also possess large numbers of modern, 
sophisticated FACS. 63 China operates more than 210 Huangfen 
and Hegu class FACs, export versions of Russia's Osa I and 
Komar classes. 
In the Mediterranean, Algeria ( 11) , Egypt ( 22) , Greece 
(14), Israel (19), Libya (24) and Turkey (16) all operate 
significant numbers of FACs. syria's previously large fleet 
of nineteen FACs are in the process of being decommissioned.•• 
Finland ( 16), Germany ( 40), Norway ( 30) and sweden ( 28) 
operate FACs in the Northern Atlantic and North Sea and all of 
the Persian Gulf nations operate FACs with Bahrain (6), Iran 
(10), Qatar (7) and the UAE (10) having the most significant 
fleets. 
The primary builders of FACs are the United states, 
Russia, China, sweden, Israel and Germany. The largest 
exporter is currently China which recently delivered thirty-
two of its Huangfen FACs to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and 
Egypt. 65 The French have recently entered the market by 
introducing a new FAC (Iris) with a very specific capability, 
anti-air defense, to act as an escort for unarmed merchant 
63Joris Janssen Lok, "FACs: Adapting the Art of Hit and 
Run," Jane's Defense Weekly 17 (24 October 1991): 30. 
65Ibid. I 28. 
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traffic.•• sweden is considered the leading builder of high-
tech FACs and its Smyge program has made great advances in 
stealth technology and survivability. 
The corvette maintains many of the FACs 
characteristics but is a more capable craft and one which is 
not confined to coastal operations. They are larger (up to 
200 feet), displace between 500-1000 tons and carry crews of 
up to 100. Corvettes often possess a more sophisticated anti-
air and anti-submarine capability and can function as an 
independent command and control platform. They are equipped 
to operate independently for up to two weeks. 
Twenty-four nations include corvettes in their navies 
with Russia's 208 vessels being by far the largest fleet. 
India operates twenty corvettes and the South Korean Navy 
twenty-six. Other significant corvette operators include 
Indonesia (16), Italy (14), sweden {6), Singapore {6), Ecuador 
{ 6 ) and Peru ( 6 ) • The primary builders of corvettes are 
Russia, Italy, South Korea and the United States while several 
others have programs in the development stage. India is 
currently attempting to establish an indigenous corvette 
••stan Zimmerman, "Modern Patrol Boats Bolster Smaller 
Navies," Armed Forces Journal International 128 (June 1991): 74. 
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building program that includes the development of gas turbine 
engines. 67 
Many nations have realized that a strong coastal navy 
is important for challenging claims against its Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and preventing the exploitation of its 
maritime resources. Additional missions for these c~astal 
navies include combating smuggling, piracy and illegal 
immigration, and deterring the unwanted presence of an outside 
aggressor in its territorial waters. 
The requirement for a fast, heavily-armed, low 
maintenance vessel to perform these missions makes FACs and 
corvettes the ideal platform for a number of the world's 
navies. Given the United states' continuing reliance on naval 
presence as a means of containing crises in the Third World, 
it is increasingly likely that our presence may be challenged 
by these highly capable vessels. 
2. Diesel-Electric Submarines 
The proliferation of modern diesel-electric submarines 
by many of the world's lesser navies represents a major threat 
to the u.s. Navy. Because of their relatively small size, 
diesel-electric submarines are well suited for operations in 
the world's coastal regions and maritime chokepoints, 
67Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg, "The Trend Towards 
Replacement of FACs with Corvettes," Far Eastern Economic Review (September-october 1993): 286. 
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precisely the areas in which " ••• From the Sea" envisions the 
u.s. Navy operating. 
The increasing sophistication and lethality of modern 
diesel-electric submarines requires that a large number of 
assets be devoted to locating and neutralizing them. In the 
Falklands war, the British were forced to expend significant 
resources on anti-submarine warfare in order to counter the 
threat that one Argentine submarine posed. The same would be 
true today if the Iranians attempted to close the Straits of 
Hormuz or the Indonesians threatened the Straits of Malacca. 
An approaching American battlegroup might be viewed as an 
attractive target to a hostile submarine particularly if he 
can approach the group undetected. 
There are currently 425 diesel-electric submarines in 
service with forty-five navies. 6 • These highly sophisticated 
and capable weapons platforms are becoming the ship of choice 
for many maritime nations wishing to develop modern navies. 
All are capable of launching torpedoes and laying J'llines and an 
increasing number are being equipped with tactical missiles. 
Advances in sensor technologies, propulsion systems and fire-
control systems are bringing many of these submarines near 
technical parity with the United States' nuclear attack 
68David Miller, "The Silent Menace: Diesel Electric 
Submarines in 1993," International Defense Review 26 (August 
1993): 613. 
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submarines. They are also an ideal platform for surveillance 
and the delivery of special forces troops. 
The German Type 209 is the most common diesel-electric 
submarine in the world. Worldwide, there are fifty Type 209s 
operated by thirteen navies including Indonesia, Turkey, 
Greece, Argentina, Peru and Brazil. The Type 209 has a 400 
nautical mile radius of action, can run at twenty-three knots 
submerged and carries fourteen torpedoes or twenty-eight 
mines. A relatively small crew of thirty and a high degree of 
automation make it an ideal purchase for many of the world's 
smaller navies and its price (currently $100 million) is 
affordable by modern warship standards. 69 
The Russian Kilo class submarine is the second most 
common diesel-electric submarine. Currently, seven navies 
operate a total of thirty-seven Kilos. 70 The Kilo is capable 
of carrying eighteen torpedoes or thirty-six mines and several 
versions have been outfitted with surface to surface missiles. 
The Kilo's significant mine-laying capability poses a threat 
which would be difficult to counter especially in the world's 
narrow shipping channels. It is a true ocean-going submarine 
with a radius of action of over 6,000 nautical miles and a 
crew of sixty. 
6
'Zimmerman, 76. 
70John Jordan, "The Kilo Class Submarine," Jane's 
Intelligence Reyiew 4 (September 1992): 429. 
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In the Mediterranean, forty modernized and newly built 
diesel-electric submarines are operated by eleven countries. 
Israel, Italy and TUrkey operate the most modern and capable 
submarines in the region while Libya, Albania and Yugoslavia 
operate the least sophisticated boats. 71 In the North Arabian 
Sea and the Indian Ocean, Iran's three Kilos and the eight 
diesel-electric boats operated by India, are the most capable 
and could pose a significant threat to shipping in the region. 
Pakistan and Indonesia also possess modern diesel-electric 
submarines. 
In the Asia/Pacific region, 130 ·diesel-electric 
submarines are operated by China, North and South Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan. Of these, thirty-five are modern boats 
capable of launching torpedoes and sub-launched tactical 
missiles. 72 Japan's ten Yuushio class boats are the most 
sophisticated and are manned by highly trained crews. The 
twenty-four Whiskey and Romeo class boats operated by the 
North Koreans are considered the most technologically backward 
and poorly maintained in the region. 73 However, if 
survivability is not a consideration, they still represent a 
significant threat. 
71Joris Janssen Lok, "Submarine Forces: Silent but Deadly 
Threat," Jane's Pefence Weekly 18 (12 September 1992): 46. 
73Miller, 614. 
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The navies of South America operate the most uniformly 
modern diesel-electric submarines in the world. Brazil builds 
its own Type 209 class boats and fields twelve modern diesel-
electric&. Peru, Chile and Argentina all have very capable 
diesel-electric& and Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela also have 
older submarines in their naval inventories. An Argentine 
Type 209, "San Luis," stifled British ASW efforts during the 
Falklands War of 1982. 
Large-scale, open-ocean warfare remains a possibility 
which the u.s. Navy cannot afford to ignore, however, it would 
seem very unlikely unless the Russian Navy was reconstituted 
and aggressively redeployed. Diesel-electric submarines 
represent the type of threat that the u.s. Navy is most likely 
to encounter in the crisis management and regional conflict 
scenarios that " ••• From the Sea" envisions. The 
sophistication and affordabili ty of many of these vessels 
combined with the willingness of the Russians and the Chinese 
to export their military hardware in search of hard currency, 
means that the prolifer~tion of these boats will continue to 
increase. 
3. Tactical Aircraft 
Modern tactical aircraft significantly increase the 
military potential of many nations of the developing world. 
They can carry weapons loads of several tons up to 1, 000 
kilometers and fly at speeds of up to Mach 2 in all weather 
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conditions. With modern fire control systems, tactical 
aircraft can drop ordnance with an accuracy of less than fifty 
meters. 7 • By comparison, most ballistic missiles available to 
Third World nations have accuracies from a few hundred meters 
to a kilometer or more. 75 
Because of these characteristics, the proliferation of 
advanced combat aircraft capable of delivering conventional 
and unconventional ordnance has increased dramatically in the 
last ten years. Since 1983, combat aircraft sales have 
increased in many regions of the developing world: East Asia 
+5%, Middle East +8%, Latin America +14%, South Asia +24% and 
Sub-Saharan Africa +39%. 76 During this same time period, the 
number of NATO and former Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft has 
remained relatively the same. 
Fifty nations operate modern tactical aircraft and 
eight states in the developing world (India, Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and syria) operate what 
are considered top-of-the-line aircraft such as the American 
F-15 and Russian Mig-29. 77 Sixteen other nations fly less 
74John R. Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced 
Strike Aircraft," International Security 17 (Fall 1992): 47. 
76Keith Krause, Arms and the state: Patterns of Military 




capable, yet highly sophisticated strike aircraft such as the 
F-16, su-24, Tornado and Mirage 2000. These aircraft carry 
modern air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, precision-
guided munitions and sophisticated reconnaissance and 
surveillance systems. 
The primary suppliers of modern tactical aircraft are 
the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain and China. 
Like many modern weapon systems, the infrastructure required 
to operate a squadron of modern tactical aircraft is extensive 
and complex. Many nations which boast modern, highly capable 
tactical aircraft do not have the trained pilots and 
technicians required to fully realize the potential of the 
aircraft and their systems. The dismal performance of the 
Libyans (1986) and the Iraqis (1991) against American pilots 
is indicative of this weakness. 
The most sophisticated tactical aircraft are still 
those of the United States and future advances in stealth 
technology, precision-guided munitions and jet engines will 
continue to provide the United States with a qualitative edge 
over any adversary in most cases. However, as the Falklands 
War (1982) and the Iraqi attack on the uss Stark (1987) 
pointed out, American rules of engagement may allow an 
aggressive pilot in a relatively unsophisticated tactical 
aircraft to inflict a lot of damage against a modern naval 
warship equipped with the most sophisticated defenses. As 
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more nations become equipped with advanced tactical aircraft, 
the threat to American naval forces will only increase 
particularly in scenarios where a naval vessel is patrolling 
alone. 
4 • Naval llines 
Since World War II, naval mines have been used 
thirteen times in wars and lesser hostilities. 78 These large, 
unsophisticated, floating bombs have nearly been the bane of 
several modern navies, including the United States. Today, 
mine technology has improved significantly making the modern, 
multi-sensor mine with the ability to burrow itself into the 
sea floor and defend itself against most countermeasures, an 
extremely difficult threat to counter. 
Absolute control of the littorals is crucial to the 
u.S. Navy performing the types of operations outlined in 
" •.. From the Sea • " From a strategic point of view, the 
littorals offer an ideal mining target. Shallow water, a soft 
sea floor and a high volume of waterborne traffic produce 
excellent conditions for offensive mines. Coastal mine fields 
in very shallow water (10-40 feet} and the surf zone (10 feet 
to the beach) are hazards against which the u.s. Navy has very 
little protection. 
78J. M. Martin, (Captain, USNR Ret. ) , "We Sti 11 Haven't 
Learned," u.s. Naval Institute Proceedings 117 (July 1991): .66. 
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Modern mines are computer-controlled, prograllllllable 
devices capable of recognizing potential targets by their 
acoustic, magnetic or pressure signatures. 79 They can be laid 
by surface vessels, aircraft and submarines and are capable of 
carrying a tremendous amount of conventional explosives, up to 
2, 400 kilograms in some cases. •o Some can even be pre-
programmed to attack specific types of vessels or delay 
detonation until a certain number of targets pass over it. 
Mines sink ships either by direct contact or by shock 
waves and whipping effects. Even if a mine does not actually 
sink a ship, it often produces disabling effects which may 
place the vessel at risk to a secondary attack. When the uss 
Princeton struck a mine in the Persian Gulf, the ship's 
Vertical Launch system for standard air-defense missiles, main 
gun and Harpoon anti-ship missile launchers were temporarily 
put out of action leaving the Princeton vulnerable to a 
surface or air attack which fortunately did not come.•1 
There are basically three types of naval mines: 
floating, moored and ground mines. All are activated by 
79Sheila Galatowi tsch, "Undersea Mines Grow smarter and 
Deadlier," pefense Electronics 23 (March 1991): 57. 
80Anthony Preston, "Mine Warfare in the 1990s," Asian 
Pefence Journal 5 (May 1993): 48. 
81David Foxwell, "Naval Mine Warfare: Unfunded and 
Underappreciated," International pefense Reyiew 26 (February 
1993): 125-26. 
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direct contact or by the influence of a passing vessel. The 
simplest mine is the buoyant contact mine which is triggered 
by contact with a target vessel. These mines are difficult to 
see or pickup on sonar and difficult to track because they 
drift with the prevailing currents. There are several 
variants of the moored mine including variable depth 
antisubmarine mines and the rising mine which can be laid in 
deep-water and programmed to rise to the surface at a later 
time. Ground mines are activated by vessels passing overhead 
and may bury themselves in the seabed floor to avoid 
detection. The average bottom mine is a shaped cylinder 21 
inches in diameter and seven feet in length with a 1,000 pound 
warhead. 82 
Modern naval mines are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated and difficult to detect. Some are coated with 
anechoic materials or materials that accelerate marine growth, 
making detection extremely difficult. 83 Many have a twenty 
year shelf life including up to 700 operational in-water days: 
aging mines may be kept operational by upgrading sensing and 
control systems. Future mines may be rocket-propelled, 
possess artificial intelligence and be extremely resistdnt to 
82Frank B. Kelso II, (Admiral, US Navy), "Building Blocks of 
Naval Power," u.s. Nayal Institute Proceedings 118 !November 
1992): 39. 
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countermeasures. The prototype Intelligent Self-Burying 
Hunter Mine ( ISBHM) embodies all of the above features. These 
characteristics give the mine superb offensive and defensive 
weapon capabilities, making it a cheap and effective weapon 
for use against even the most powerful surface and submarine 
forces. 
The military value of naval mines has been aptly 
demonstrated several times in the past decade. Shipping 
movements in the Red Sea were disrupted in 1983 by the Libyan 
minelayer, Ghat. During the Iran-Iraq War ( 1980-88) five 
merchant ships were sunk by mines before mine sweeping 
operations were begun. In spite of extensive clearing 
operations, two tankers (Bridgeton and Texaco Caribbean) and 
an American warship (USS Samuel Roberts) were also damaged 
when they struck moored mines. 
During the Gulf War, two ships (USS Tripoli and uss 
Princeton) were both heavily damaged by mines and Iraq's 
mining of the beaches around Kuwait City effectively 
neutralized the American amphibious group waiting offshore. 
While it did not alter the ultimate outcome, Iraqi minefields 
did present risks which were viewed as excessive and 
essentially prevented an attack from the sea against Kuwait 
City. According to Major General Harry w. Jenkins, Jr. , 
commander of the Marine amphibious force in the Persian Gulf, 
the Marines did not land on the beaches at Kuwait City 
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because, "The threat of mines in shallow water drove the 
planning and we didn't know where the mines were.n•• 
Following the Gulf War, three lessons learned were 
gleaned in regard to mine warfare: Iraqi mines kept coalition 
forces from gaining total control of the northern Persian 
Gulf; mines interfered with sealift; mines prevented American 
battleships from maneuvering freely to provide naval gunfire 
support.•5 The u.s. also contributed only 13% of the mine 
countermeasure forces during the war.•6 In the early stages 
of many of the operations envisioned in " ••• From the Sea, " the 
u.s. Navy will be going it alone and will not be able to 
depend on mine warfare support from its allies. 
Today, the proliferation of naval mines needs to be 
one of the top concerns for u.s. Naval planners. Forty-six 
nations possess a mine laying capability and the mine 
inventory of Russia alone may be as high as 500,000. 87 Fifteen 
nations produce naval mines for export including the United 
States, Italy, Great Britain, Russia, China, Sweden and 
••Edward J. Walsh, "Navy and Marine Corps Focus on Achilles' 
Heel: Shallow-Water Mines," Armed Forces Journal International 
131 (August 1993): 35. 
85Ernest Fortin, (Lieutenant, USNR) , "Those Damn Mines, " 





Germany.•• In spite of these statistics, mine warfare remains 
a significant weakness that the u.s. Navy has not adequately 
addressed. 
The u.s. Navy's serious lack of "mine consciousness" 
is not duplicated by many of the world's lesser navies. Many 
navies devote a large portio~ of their naval budgets to mine 
laying and mine warfare operations. Forty nations have some 
form of mine warfare capability. Finland and sweden both 
operate controllable fixed minefield& off their shores as part 
of an overall coastal-defense strategy. 89 The purpose of these 
fields is to deter a seaborne invasion force by effectively 
closing the fjords in times of war. It is not unrealistic to 
imagine that the same type of fields might be built by other 
nations wishing to deter aggressors. 
The naval mine continues to prove itself to be an 
effective and difficult-to-counter weapon that creates havoc 
well out of proportion to its small size. They are stealthy 
and anonymous, making them particularly attractive to small, 
Third World nations and terrorist groups which may seek to 
deter outside involvement in their affairs. They are also 
inexpensive, may be left in place for months and they can keep 
shipping contained to areas where it may be more easily 
••Foxwell, 129. 
89Ibid. I 128. 
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attacked. These factors make them effective, highly 
economical force multipliers. 
Since they are able to perform one of the traditional 
roles of maritime forces, sea denial, mines have quickly come 
to be viewed as a poor man's navy. In areas where the United 
states' interests are minimal, such as humanitarian and low 
intensity missions, an opponent may be able to achieve 
deterrence at a very low cost to himself. In 1950, Rear 
Admiral Allan Smith, commander of the amphibious task force at 
Wonsan, Korea, expressed the frustration that we may 
experience yet again: 
We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a 
navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that 
were utilized at the time of Christ. 90 
5. Antiship and cruise Missiles 
During the Gulf War, Iraq managed to launch two 
Silkworm missiles at coalition ships, neither of which struck 
its target. Some have suggested that this failure dispelled 
any notion that patrol boats or aircraft armed with antiship 
missiles could successfully engage large naval warships. Yet 
despite this most recent combat failure, an increasing number 
of small navies are purchasing sophisticated antiship 
missiles. Today, seventy-one nations have anti-ship missiles 
~amara M. Melia, Damn the Torpedoes: A Short History of 
u.s. Nayal Mine Countermeasures. 1777-1991 (Washington: Naval 
Historical Center, 1991), 76. 
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and over one hundred have some form of cruise missile. 91 More 
than sixty navies possess vessels equipped with these surface-
to-surface anti ship missilf' •.nd forty-eiqht are equipped with 
cruise missiles. 92 These Jrful and increasingly accurate 
weapons pose a significant threat to u.s. Navy assets deployed 
near the coastlines of many Third World nations. 
Antiship missiles and fast patrol boats provide 
smaller countries with the means to challenge larger navies in 
restricted coastal areas. An antish)n missile has s2veral 
advantages over a torpedo or gun: the._ :. ·": qreater range, are 
very fast and steal thy and they equire relatively 
unsophisticated aiming and guidance technology. Effective 
ranges of Western weapons are generally less than 100 miles 
while Russian and Chinese missiles have ranges of ~p to 250 
miles. 93 Antiship missiles are also able to cripple a vessel 
even if the warhead doesn't explode, witness the Exocet 
attacks on the USS Stark and the Atlantic Conveyor during the 
Iran-Iraq War and the HMS Sheffield during the Falklands War. 
Defeating supersonic, low-flying antiship missiles is 
an extremely difficult proposition. A ship's radar is a line-
nTruver and Hazlett, 82. 
nxoburger, 2. 
93Norman Freidman, "Modern Anti ship Missiles - The Great 
Equalizers," Armed Forces Journal International 129 (June 1992): 
38. 
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of-sight device and therefore has a very limited range. Any 
low-flying aircraft or cruise missile may approach within 
thirty miles of a ship before being detected, leaving only a 
few minutes of warning time before impact. 
The failures of the Iraqi ships during the Gulf War 
can be attributed to the American dominance of the airspace 
above the Gulf and the Iraqis' lack of the sophisticated 
tracking sensors and antiair missiles necessary to intercept 
inbound missiles. These inadequacies have not gone unnoticed 
by other navies. In the low intensity scenarios envisioned in 
" •.. From the Sea," it is increasingly likely that an opponent 
may attempt to use an antiship missile much earlier in the 
conflict in the hope of inflicting the type of damage that 
would lead to a u.s. withdrawal. 
Advertising by missile manufacturers stresses that 
antiship missiles are the great equalizer against superior 
naval forces and many nations have taken heed: seventy-one 
states now possess an advanced antiship missile capability. 9 • 
The French-made Exocet is the most widely distributed antiship 
missile with over 2,000 of the weapons spread amongst twenty-
nine nations. 95 In addition to France, other principle 
94Edward Kolodziej, Making and Marketing Arms: The French 
Experience and its Implications for the International System. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 183. 
95Asian Defense Journal, "The Exocet - Deadly Family of 
Antiship Missiles," 10 (October 1990): 62. 
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exporters of anti ship missiles are China, Israel, Japan, 
Russia and the United States. 96 In addition, several other 
nations either have existing programs or are pursuing long-
range antisurface missile programs. 
An equally threatening trend in weapons proliferation 
in the developing world is the cruise missile. While the MTCR 
specifically addresses cruise missiles, the proliferation of 
these weapons has long been ignored by the signatories. one 
hundred and two nations currently have cruise missileS97 
including some 6,500 Harpoons and 10,000 Russian and Chinese 
variants of the styx missile.,. There are eleven known cruise 
missile programs and eleven other nations are suspected of 
developing indigenous cruise missile production capabilities. 99 
Longer and more accurate targeting information will soon be 
available through GPS and the Russian Glonass navigation 
satellites. 
Of recent concern is the apparent export of small 
American gas turbine engines to China. The fear is that these 
engines will be adapted to a modified Silkworm giving the 
96Jane's pefence Weekly, "Standoff Delivery Comes of Age," 
15 (16 March 1991): 391. 
97James L. George, The u.s. Nayy in the 1990s: Alternatives 
for Action, Annapolis: u.s. Naval Institute, 1992: 65. 
98Zimmerman, 48. 
99Duncan Lennox, "Missile Race Continues," Jane's oefence 
Weekly 20 (23 January 1993): 20. 
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Chinese a true cruise missile capability • Given China's 
. 
apparent willingness to sell their weapons to anyone with the 
ability to pay, exports of a Chinese cruise missile are 
particularly worrisome . 100 Potential clients include Syria, 
Iran and Pakistan-all of whom are long time military customers 
of China. 
Cruise missiles have ranges of up to 250 miles (in the 
case of the Tomahawk) and accuracies have been refined down to 
10 meters. During the Gulf War, 288 cruise missiles were 
launched against Iraqi land targets with a reported accuracy 
rate of almost 85 percent. 101 Navigation and homing technology 
is developing at a rapid rate and more nations are seeing the 
value of possessing a few unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) for 
tactical reconnaissance and targeting of their cruise missiles 
and other weapon systems. Naval forces are particularly 
vulnerable to low-flying, fast and stealthy cruise missiles 
whose presence in a conflict could seriously hamper the 
effectiveness of the u.s. Navy in performing its traditional 
mission of offshore presence. 
100J<evin Fedarko, "Confounded by the Chinese Puzzle," ~ 17 
(25 April 1994): 39. 
101W. Seth Carus, cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s 
(Westport: Praeger, 1992), 1. 
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C. WEAPONS OF IIASS DESTRUCTION 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
represents the greatest threat that a nation may present to an 
American naval battle group operating off its shores. The 
possession of weapons of mass destn.tction provide an opponent 
with two important capabilities that are relevant to " ... From 
the Sea": by using them, they offer the possibility of 
inflicting enormous physical damage to American naval forces: 
and by merely threatening their use, an enemy may be able to 
dissuade the United States Navy from performing its 
traditional missions of presence, power projection and crisis 
management. 
" .•• From the Sea" presupposes control of the sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs) by the u.s. Navy. By challenging our 
control of the SLOes with the threat or use of weapons of mass 
destruction, an adversary may be able to deter the Navy from 
operating in its region. In this section, proliferation 
trends in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are 
presented. Ballistic missile proliferation is also presented 
because it represents the primary means of delivering weapons 
of mass destruction against an opponent. 
1. Nuclear Weapons 
As more countries acquire nuclear arsenals, they may find 
themselves capable of preempting us maritime assets 
deployed for compellence or coercion. In addition, the 
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possibility that a country has such a capability may deter 
the us from project.ing power against them. 10" 
Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction represents potentially the most 
dangerous threat to American military forces, it is important 
that they be included in any discussion of the future of 
warfare at sea. 
Eight nations are known to possess a nuclear weapons 
capability and five others are suspected of having 
developmental programs, if not actual weapons. It has been 
postulated that countries develop nuclear weapons programs 
under three se~s of circumstances: there are those nations 
which feel immediately threatened (Israel, Pakistan, South 
Africa, North Korea) as well as those who have recently gone 
through a military defeat and seek an autonomous deterrent 
(France, China) • Lastly, there are those nations who seek 
regional hegemony and see nuclear weapons as a valuable 
political and military tool (Iraq, Iran and India). 
Since 1945, constraints on u.s. strategy in Third 
World conflicts were largely generated by a fear of escalation 
with the Soviet Union. With this threat now greatly reduced, 
the emergence of regional powers armed with nuclear weapons 
has become a source of concern for American military planners. 
The rapidly increasing access to multi-use technologies and a 
102Arnett, 2-3. 
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growing scientific and technological culture would appear to 
be fostering the ambitions of those who wish to arm themselves 
with man's most destructive weapon. 
The threat of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass 
destruction being used against a naval battle group by a 
regional adversary is sure ·to change the calculus of the 
crisis. The advantage of a nuclear weapon is that it can 
destroy a naval warship with a single blast. The accuracy of 
the weapon is not as important and it can severely 
incapacitate a ship it does not destroy by disrupting the 
electronics and communications equipment onboard. From an 
adversary's point of view, using a weapon of mass destruction 
only against naval forces at sea may avoid uncontrolled 
escalation, civilian casualties and indiscriminate damage to 
property on land. 
2. Cheai.cal Weapons 
Since World War I, large-scale attacks using chemical 
weapons have occurred on five occasions: Italy's invasion of 
Ethiopia (1935-36), Japan's occupation of Manchuria (1937-45), 
Egypt's intervention in Yemen (1965-67), the Soviet Union's 
occupation of Afghan5.stan ( 1980s) ard during the Iran-Iraq War 
( 1980-88) . 103 Today, two dozen nations maintain stockpiles of 
103Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction," International Security 16 (Summer 1991): 15. 
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chemical weapons including Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Libya, 
North Korea, Pakistan and Syria. 104 
Chemical agents fall into one of four categories: 
choking agents, blood agents, blister agents and nerve agents. 
Choking agents, such as phosgene, attack the respiratory 
system, causing irritation and inflammation of the lungs. 
Blood agents act by preventing the utilization of oxygen in 
the blood. common blood agents include hydrogen cyanide and 
arsine. Because they affect the respiratory system, both 
choking and blood agents are easily defeated by gas masks. 
Blister agents, such as mustard gas, kill by absorption 
through the skin as well ~s by inhalation. 
Nerve agents are by far the most chemical weapons. 
They interfere with cholinesterase, an enzyme involved in 
nerve transmission. 105 Nerve agents are lethal in 
concentrations less than one-tenth that of choking, blood or 
blister agents. There is little defense against an attack 
with nerve agents. 
The United States and the Soviet Union both developed 
ballistic missile warheads specifically designed for chemical 
munitions. The two most heavily exported Soviet missiles, the 
FROG and SCUD-B, can be 01 fitted with a small, cylindrical 
104Ibid. , 14. 
105Ibid. I 16. 
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burst charge surrounded by a large amount of chemical agent. 
However, it is not necessary to develop sophisticated warhead 
technology to deliver the agents. During the Iran-Iraq War, 
Iraq used crop-dusting helicopters purchased from the United 
States to carry out its chemical weapons attacks against 
Kurdish civilians. 1~ 
Chemical weapons are not capable of producing the same 
numbers of casualties as nuclear or biological weapons. Yet, 
because production costs of chemical weapons are so low - as 
little as $20 per kilog ·m - they offer Third World nations a 
cheap weapon of terror. Depending on the circumstances (wind 
conditions, warning time, type of agent, delivery vehicle), 
chemical weapons can be a minor nuisance or a weapon of 
massive destruction. While gas masks provide protection 
against all but heavy concentrations of nerve agents, their 
degree of protection is dependent upon variables such as 
availability, fit and training. Regardless of the type of 
agent, the threat of use against a military force necessitates 
the taking of precautions which may adversely impact the 
ability of the force to conduct its assigned mission. 
3. Biological Weapons 
The lethality of biological agents approaches that of 
small nuclear weapons. They are more difficult to develop 
~6Stuart Auerbach, "$1.5 Billion in u.s. Sales to Iraq," 
Washington Post, 11 March 1991, Al. 
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than chemical agents but are relatively simple to develop 
compared to nuclear weapons development programs. Officially, 
no nation is known to possess biological weapons today. 
However, the United States, Russia, Great Britain and Japan 
are known to have developed weapons in the past, and Russia, 
Iraq and Syria, are strongly .suspected of having biological 
weapons programs in various stages of development. 107 
Biological agents are divided into two categories: 
toxins and pathogens. Toxins, such as botulism, are deadly 
chemicals produced by living organisms while pathogens, such 
as anthrax, are living organisms which produce disease. 
Toxins are not well-suited for aerial delivery because they 
decay rapidly when they come into contact with air. They are, 
however, inexpensive and easily introduced to the wa~ 
supplies of civilian populations or unsuspecting military 
units. 
Pathogens, on the other hand, have proven to be ideal 
agents for air-dropped or missile-delivered munitions. 
Pathogens form spores which are very resilient to violen~. 
delivery methods and do not decay upon exposure to air, light 
and, water. Estimates say that nuclear weapons are 100 to 
1,000 times more deadly than chemical weapons yet only about 
107Fetter, 23. 
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10 times as deadly as an anthrax warhead attack . 108 Nearly all 
those exposed to the anthrax virus are killed within a few 
days and the spores may be able to survive in the soil for up 
to a decade. When used against a prepared population, an 
anthrax weapon would produce the same number of casualties as 
a small nuclear weapon. 
Chemical and biological weapons have not posed a 
serious threat to the United states Navy in the past. But to 
perform future missions, "· •• From the Sea" envisions 
operations close to an enemy's shore and in MRCs, elements of 
a battle group may be positioned within a harbor to provide 
anti-air or TBMD capabilities to nearby forces or the civilian 
populace. This may place Naval forces in grave danger of 
exposure to chemical and biological weapons. These weapons 
have the potential to neutralize any naval warship by killing 
the entire crew while leaving the vessel intact. Their 
relatively low cost, ease of delivery and lack of effective 
safeguards against them these weapons an ideal choice for 
military, as well as for deterrent and terroristic, purposes. 
4. Ballistic Missiles 
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), signed 
in 1987 and supported by twenty-three countries today, has 
helped curb the spread of long-range missiles that might 
108lbid. , 27. 
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threaten the United States. However, it does not deter the 
spread of tactical ballistic missiles with a range of 100 to 
1000 miles and the transfer of the technologies which are 
necessary to build them. The acquisition of tactical 
ballistic missiles by many Third World nations presents the 
u.s. Navy with a dangerous and extremely difficult threat to 
counter. 
The list of countries which possess a ballistic 
missile capability now numbers thirty-four and is growing 
every year. 109 seven nations (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, 
Afghanistan, Egypt and Yemen) have used ballistic missiles in 
combat. 110 These weapons are highly sought because they affect 
the regional military balance in the following ways: they are 
very fast weapons and therefore provide little warning of an 
incoming attack: they are capable of delivering a variety of 
warheads: accurate missiles can hit small, mobile military 
targets: and only the United States and Russia currently have 
even a rudimentary defense against ballistic missiles. 
The acquisition of tactical ballistic missiles is 
limited only by the resources which a nation wishes to devote 
to them. In nations where the leadership feels constantly 
threatened by its enemies or is inspired to disrupt the status 
109Lennox , 18 • 
110John B. Wolfsthal, "The Proliferation of Ballistic 
Missiles," Arms Control Today 22 (April 1992): 28. 
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quo, the acquisition of a minimal missile capability may be 
their number one acquisition priority. The goal is the 
possession of a weapon which can be used for deterrence, 
retaliation or terror against one's perceived enemies. High-
tech delivery and guidance systems is readily available and 
may be added to relatively unsophisticated missiles, greatly 
extending their range, accuracy and lethality. 
Modern warhead technology is widely available and can 
be obtained at a relatively low cost. Conventional warheads 
in ballistic missiles include high explosives, bomblet 
warheads and fuel-air explosives. Chemical warhead agents and 
small nuclear devices are also readily adaptable to ballistic 
missiles. Sophistication is not required; the mere capability 
may be sufficient to make an opponent take elaborate 
protective measures if not deter him completely. 
The ease with which technology is acquired is not 
meant to convey that the development of a ballistic missile 
program is relatively easy cheap. Testing, quality control 
and the import of scientists and technology make the program 
one which requires a large allocation of available resources. 
Outside of the G-7 nations and Russia, only Israel and China 
possess an indigenous ballistic missile production capability. 
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But Spain, Taiwan, North Korea and India are close to 
developing their own programs. 111 
The legal barriers to acquiring ballistic missile 
production technology can be circumvented since most of the 
technology involved is considered "dual use", meaning that it 
has non-military applications as well, and is therefore 
difficult to regulate. Equally difficult to control is the 
selling of weapons and technology by the former Soviet Union. 
The end of the Cold War has provided those nations who have a 
desire for ballistic missiles with a ready source of 
information and in-stock items. The same holds true in China 
where the leadership has used the collapse of the Soviet Union 
to liberalize their own economic policies including the sale 
of ballistic missiles, satellite imagery and other high tech 
items previously unavailable on the open market. 
D. SUMMARY 
Maritime power cannot be measured by static comparisons of 
the naval forces available to two combatants but must be 
considered in the context of the immediate dispute. In the 
post-Cold War era, the asymmetry of naval forces which the 
United States has acted under appears to be narrowing, giving 
many nations of the Third World the ability to challenge the 
111Lennox, 18. 
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u.s. Navy, especially in the limited, shallow-water operations 
described in " •.• From the Sea." 
The United States Navy has traditionally held the home 
field advantage when it projects power ashore because it 
usually did so from the safe confines of the open ocean: 
rarely was it forced to sail in harm's way. By contrast, 
littoral warfare requires that high value assets be placed in 
vulnerable positions that may result in their loss. The 
necessity of conducting operations in the narrow seas presents 
opponents with an opportunity to strike a damaging blow 
against a u.s. military asset in order to deter American 
involvement in the conflict. 
The United States will continue to have the world's 
largest and most capable Navy for the foreseeable future. In 
the absence of the Soviet threat and in spite of the current 
downsizing, the United States military should be able to 
devote significantly more assets to regional contingencies. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy may initially arrive on-scene 
outgunned and at a tactical disadvantage. 
Many nations are well aware of the potency of a modern 
coastal navy in defending their national interests. The 
opponents that we may face in the future will attack with t·ast 
attack craft, diesel-electric submarines, modern strike 
aircraft, sophisticated mines and high-speed cruise missiles. 
They will employ modern sensor technologies for surveillance 
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and targeting and they may possess the ability to threaten a 
battle group with weapons of mass destruction. All of these 
factors will combine to severely challenge the u.s. Navy's 
ability to perform the missions outlined in " .•• From the Sea." 
Forward presence, power projection and crisis management, 
traditional missions for th·e United States Navy, become 
increasingly complicated in a world where military 
technologies and capabilities may eventually become equal. 
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V. OPBRATIOIIALIZIIIG • ••• FROM THE SBA• 
The key to " ••• From the Sea's" success will be the ability 
of the Navy to establish sea control and achieve battlespace 
dominance in the littoral regions of the world. Whether 
fought on the high seas or in the littorals, these two 
objectives have always been central tenets of naval warfare. 
If we are unsuccessful in our bid to control and dominate the 
battlespace of the littorals, the threat of air strikes and 
cruise missile attacks from the sea becomes hollow •112 For the 
u.s. Navy, this means aggressive anti-air, submarine and 
surface warfare, all prerequisites for conducting offensive 
operations against the enemy ashore. 
" ••• From the Sea" may represent a new approach for the 
u.s. Navy but if this evolution in doctrine is not 
complimented by a concurrent period of equipment development 
and procurement, a time lag wi 11 occur between the new 
technical capabilities and the realization of the operational 
capability. In this era of declining budgets and increasing 
commitments, it is imperative that we allocate the available 
112 Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. (Captain, USN Retired) , Nayal Forces 
in Joint Littoral Warfare, Paper presented at the Military 
Operations Research Symposium under the auspices of the Johns 
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, February 26, 1993, 
4-5. 
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resources to the areas where they will have the most impact. 
This will require a relentless program of recapitalization in 
order to build the framework and foundation for tomorrow's 
fleet. 
Despite the current downsizing, the Navy still maintains 
a formidable power projection and crisis response capability 
in the form of its aircraft carriers, Aegis warships, 
amphibious assault ships and submarines. However, we are 
deficient in certain areas, namely mine detection and 
countermeasures, shallow-water ASW, close-air support (CAS), 
naval surface fire support (NSFS), ballistic missile defense, 
sealift, medium-lift helicopters and protection against 
chemical and nuclear weapons. These weaknesses undermine our 
ability to exercise sea control in the littorals and project 
power ashore. They also represent an Achilles heel which a 
clever opponent may try to exploit. 
To truly operationalize " ••• From the Sea," the Navy needs 
a strategic vision for itself and a coherent and comprehensive 
long-term plan keyed to that vision. This requires strong 
leadership, a comprehensive procurement plan 1 strategic 
research and development and innovative new concepts of 
operations. The overall goal of this strategic vision should 
be to design and build a post-Cold War Navy which is able to 
conduct the types of missions envisioned in " •.• From the Sea" 
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in a world made increasingly hazardous by the proliferation of 
modern weapons and technology. 
A. A LZ'l'TORAL lfARPARB PLAN 
In a recent interview with Navy Times, Secretary of the 
Navy John H. Dalton emphasized "quality of life, minority 
recruitment, retention and women in the Navy. "113 His only 
1ention of operations was his assertion that the deep-strike 
ssion will continue to be carried out by aircraft carriers 
well into the 21st century. Admiral Mike Boorda emphasized 
moving allowances, PRTs, alcoholism, equal opportunity and 
other personnel issues in his first published interview as 
CN0. 1 u While these are certainly relevant, I believe that it 
is equally important to present a vision of the future 
operating environment and lay out a plan detailing how the 
Navy will deal with future threats and challenges. 
In order to do this, the Navy may be able to glean some 
insight from the business world, where "right-sizing" and 
strategic planning have been going on for years. Strategic 
planning is a disciplined effort to produce the fundamental 
decisions and actions that shape and guide what an 
113Nayy Times, "Dalton's Navy: steady as She Goes." May 30, 
1994, 8. 
1uNayy Times, "Boorda's Fast Start.•• 9 May 1994, 12-15. 
113 
organization is, what it does, and why it does it. 115 It is a 
way to help organizations deal with their changing environment 
(threats and opportunities) and to resolve the most critical 
issues they face. It seeks to build on their strengths 1 
minimize their deficiencies and exploit the weaknesses of 
their competition. 
A good framework for strategic planning may be found in 
John M. Bryson's book, Strategic Planning for Public and Non-
Profit Organizations, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass I 1988) • 
Bryson advocates an eight-phase process which embraces a wide 
range of alternative strategic planning models. The resulting 
hybrid model consists of an analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses within an organization (SWOT analysis) and the 
identification of internal and external threats to the 
organization (Harvard Policy Model). Strategic issues are then 
developed with these threats in mind which helps an 
organization formulate its response to a rapidly changing set 
of conditions (Ansoff and Eadie). 
It is clear that the chief danger to the u.s. Navy as it 
approaches the 21st century is the proliferation of advanced 
weapon systems and technologies previously outlined in chapter 
three. Unfortunately, these systems improve our opponent's 
capabilities in precisely the areas which the Navy is itself 
115John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Non-
Profit Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988), 5. 
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vulnerable. If we do not develop a strategic littoral warfare 
response to cope with these threats. The American leadership 
(military and civilian) may eventually have to reassess the 
feasibility of deploying the u.s. Navy to regional hotspots. 
The doctrine to deal with the threat is there. " .•. From 
the Sea" is exactly the type of doctrine which we need to 
transform the Navy from a Cold War, open-ocean fleet to one 
which can fight effectively in future regional conflicts and 
win at a minimal cost. However, without a strong commitment 
by the Navy's senior leadership to outfitting the fleet with 
the proper tools, n ••• From the Sea" is nothing more than 
hyperbole. It also entails more than just buying the right 
systems and equipment: organizational restructuring and 
changes in the ways that we train and operate are also 
necessary. 
The Bryson strategic planning model emphasizes the 
importance of a comprehensive "vision of success" and a leader 
who is willing to act as the sponsor to endorse and legitimize 
the effort. 116 It also requires process champions, (other 
leaders who are committed to making the process work) and 
clear agreement amongst key decision-makers about the 
direction and purpose of the strategic plan. Admiral Jeremy 
M. Boorda, as the new CNO and chief sponsor of all things 
116Ibid. 
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Navy, has a golden opportunity to establish a new strategic 
vision for the U.s. Navy which places as much emphasis O•l 
littoral sea control and battlespace dominance as it does on 
power projection. 
Process champions for this new strategic vision would 
logically be Admiral Thomas J. Lopez, Deputy CNO for 
Resources, warfare Requirements and Assessments ( NS) and 
Admiral J. Paul Reason, Deputy CNO for Plans, Policy and 
Operations (NJ/5). The Deputy CNO for Training (N7) and the 
Deputy CNO for Logistics (N4) would also have to be actively 
involved. The heads of the warfare communities: N85 
(Expeditionary Warfare), N86 (Surface Warfare), N87 (Submarine 
warfare}, NBS (Air Warfare} and N89 (Special Programs}, would 
make up the strategic planning team. 
Readiness and combat effectiveness are contingent on the 
ability of the Navy's leadership to effectively articulate our 
roles and missions and ensure that our investment of 
increasingly scarce resources makes sense for the future. By 
speaking with clarity and a unity of purpose, the Navy 1 s 
leadership will ensure that the Navy maintains a steady course 
and is able to meet the challenges of the future. 
B. COMCEPTS 1 OPERATIONS AlfD TRAINING , 
In addition to new doctrinal and force-structure thinking, 
" ••• From the Sea" requires innovative concepts, creative 
operations and focus@d training in order to succeed in the 
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regional and littoral environment. It may require the Navy to 
mute o~ abandon certain traditional missions and focus its 
efforts on more specific roles within the framework of joint 
littoral warfare. All restructuring efforts should 
concentrate on improving the Navy's ability to exercise sea 
control and battlespace dominance in the littorals. The 
following recommendations are designed to bridge the gap 
between the doctrinal concepts of " .•. From the Sea" and the 
operational capabilities which the Navy currently has or is 
pursuing. 
When the fighting starts, the carrier disappears over the 
horizon. We've known that since Guadalcanal. 117 
Naval aviation has traditionally been relied on to perform 
five missions: strategic land attack, tactical attack, air 
superiority and anti-surfac~ surveillance and strike warfare. 
A problem that continues to plague the Navy is the view that 
sea-based airpower can, and should, accomplish all of these 
missions. But the Navy has spread itself very thin in aircraft 
procurement and focused its efforts on improving its power 
projection capabilities. 
The Gulf War highlighted some important limitations of 
carrier-based airpower. U.S ~arriers were designed for open-
ocean, blue-water operations. Shallow and confined waters, the 
117Bill Sweetman, "Naval Air Power for 2000: Time to Change 
Course." International oefense Review 25 (September 1992): ~42. 
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threat of mines and attacks from shore and sea-based missiles 
were not considered when designing modern aircraft carriers. 
Because of these constraints, u.s carriers operated in the Red 
Sea and the southern Persian Gulf for the majority of the war. 
The long distances to Iraqi targets meant that each carrier was 
limited to launching two strike packages of 20-30 aircraft per 
day. 118 By contrast, the 900 u.s. Air Force aircraft operating 
out of Saudi Arabia ilew 5-6 missions per day. Discounting 
fleet-defense missions, the sortie totals were 29,400 for the 
USAF and 6,200 for the Navy. When one considers that it took 
six carriers to achieve this result, it becomes apparent that 
the foremost role of carrier-based airpower may not be in deep-
strike, strategic-bombing in competition with the USAF. 
To preserve naval aviation, the Navy must reevaluate its 
role in future defense planning scenarios and tailor its 
procurement, training and tactics to best perfC"rm its mission. 
Given the increasingly sophisticated nature of the regional 
threat, it has become increasingly hazardous to bring a carrier 
into the littorals. Unsupported carrier-based air forces also 
cannot take full advantage of inflight refueling, a requirement 
if they are to get within range of deep-strike land targets. In 
addition, risking manned-aircraft for these missions seems 
unwise, given the success of the TLAM attacks against Iraqi 
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targets during Operation Desert Storm. With this in mind, 
strategic land-attack should be formally abandoned as a mission 
for Naval aviation. 
Naval aviation should instead be refocused on air 
superiority and the close air support of expeditionary forces is 
so critical to the success of " .•• From the Sea." In regional 
conflicts, naval forces will earn their keep by establishing 
dominant sea control in the littorals and protecting the 
seaborne transport of troops and supplies into the theater, not 
by conducting deep-strike missions' against the enemy. 
Conducting deep-strike, strategic missions will be the primary 
role of the Air Force in a Major-Regional conflict. Its bombers 
combine heavy payloads with a longer unrefueled range, reducing 
their need for tactical support. Navy Tomahawk cruise missile 
attacks will also perform deep-strike strategic missions. 
However, USAF bombers and Navy cruise missiles cannot 
perform close-air support (CAS}, battlefield air interdiction 
(BAI} and defensive counter-air missions. F/A-18s and AV-Ss 
from CVNs and LHD/LHAs, are tailor-made platforms for conducting 
these classic tactical air missions. In the critical initial 
stages of a conflict, sea-based airpower is the only element 
which can rapidly concentrate in support of u.s. and allied 
expeditionary forces. Our research, procurement and training 
should be realigned to better prepare Naval and Marine Corps 
r 'ators for warfare in the littorals. 
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The F/A-18 Hornet will provide the Navy-Marine Corps team 
with a short-range, high-tech, multi-mission, survivable, all-
weather strike aircraft. However, having both Navy and Marine 
corps F/A-18s is redundant. If the Navy and Marine Corps are 
serious about their joint team, this redundancy must be 
addressed. Deploying a Marine corps F/A-18 squadron aboard an 
aircraft carrier is creative but it does not provide sufficient 
close-air support for an expeditionary force. Transferring all 
F/A-18 assets to the Navy and reorienting their mission, is both 
smart and cost-effective. 
In a large-scale amphibious operation, Navy F/A-18s and 
Marine AV-8Bs would provide close-air support and conduct 
battlefield air interdiction missions. Both aircraft are well-
suited to conduct these missions and the F/A-18E/F (Advanced 
Hornet), with its greater range, endurance and payload, will 
enhance this capability even further when introduced in the year 
2000. Eliminating this redundancy would allow both forces to 
maintain their core capabilities and perhaps even allow for a 
growth in the number of airframes and pilots within each 
community. 
In future low intensity conflicts, surface units will 
consistently operate independently outside of the protective 
cover of carrier aviation. Tactical Naval helicopters provide 
a low-cost organic air capability to these ships operating in 
the littorals. During the Gulf War, Army helicopters operating 
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off u.s. Navy ships provided surface units with an autonomous 
attack, defense and reconnaissance capability. British Sea Lynx 
helicopters armed with Sea Skua missiles successfully engaged 
and sank a half dozen Iraqi warships. Future Army helicopters, 
such as the RAH-66 Comanche and AH-640 Apache, will make use of 
unparalleled communications and sensor technologies making them 
the ideal platform for conducting integrated operations between 
land and sea-based forces. 
The inherent flexibility of tactical helicopters makes them 
the ideal platform for conducting a host of the missions in the 
regional warfare scenarios envisioned in " ••• From the Sea." 
These actions include enforcement of embargo sanctions, 
offensive strikes against hostile forces, antisubmarine 
operations and defense against fast attack craft (FACs) armed 
with surface-to-surface missiles. 119 Additionally, helicopters 
provide Navy ships with a true over-the-Horizon (OTH) targeting 
capability, extended reconnaissance range and the ability to 
conduct logistics transfers. Newly emerging technologies (Magic 
Lantern) hold the promise of further expanding the mission 
portfolio of Naval helicopters by detecting and countering mines 
using laser technologies. 
1190. A. Dahl , (Lieutenant Commander, USN) , "Tacth::al Naval 
Helicopters can Help." u.s. Naval Institute Proceedings 119 
(September 1993): 72. 
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Despite the advantages that tactical Navy helicopters would 
bring to the fleet, the Navy's plan to outfit a limited number 
of SH-60F helicopters with Hellfire and Penguin missile systems 
continues to slide. One option is to deploy Army or Marine 
helicopters aboard Navy ships on a full-time, extended cruise 
basis. This would greatly improve the combat effectiveness of 
ships operating in the littorals and enhance joint training 
while minimizing the requirement for new investments in Naval 
helicopter weapon systems. 
Increasing the efficiency, availability and capabilities of 
Naval helicopters while minimizing costs should also be a 
primary goal any littoral warfare plan. Four different 
helicopters, and logistics trails, currently support the fleet 
(SH-JH, CH-460, SH-60B/F and CH-SJE). None have forward-firing 
guns, standoff anti-ship missiles or defensive countermeasures 
like the AN/ALQ-144 Infrared Jammer and AN/ALE-47 chaff/flare 
dispenser. Increased aircraft commonality and systems modularity 
would successfully convert existing Naval helicopters into 
effective littoral warfare assets. Unfortunately the FY-94 
budget request cancelled the development and procurement of the 
SH-60R, a modular concept H-60 variant equipped with the 
requisite weapon systems and designed to perform a variety of 
brown and green water missions. 
Our future maritime superiority will depend on significant 
assistance from our allies. In areas such as diesel submarines, 
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Fast Attack craft, frigates and minesweepers, our allies have 
assets which could greatly enhance our ability to exercise sea 
control in the littorals. Conversely, the u.s. Navy can provide 
a high-tech centerpiece for a naval group deployed to a crisis 
which the u.s. may be reluctant to commit a Naval battle group 
to. 
A much touted, but little used capability during peacetime, 
is coalition warfare. Joint Coalition Force Packages (JCFPs) 
would make the best use of existing resources while enhancing 
our ability to conduct coalition warfare. one example might be 
using German Fast Attack Craft (FACs) to protect an American 
amphibious group from surface attack as it patrols along an 
enemy coastline. other examples may be to use American Aegis 
cruisers to provide air defense fQr a French aircraft carrier, 
incorporating British SSNs into a us carrier group or attaching 
Canadian support vessels to a u.s. group for a six month 
deployment. Training and mini-deployments would greatly enhance 
interoperability between allies and test the concept of Joint 
coalition Force Packages. 
C. PROCURBMBMT 
If the u.s. Navy is serious about " ••• From the Sea" and the 
operations that it envisions, we should be able to verify it by 
analyzing the restructuring of the fleet. Unfortunately, our 
recapitalization strategy appears to concentrate on improving 
the areas in which we have an overwhelming dominance (power 
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projection) while neglecting areas in which we are weak and 
potentially vulnerable (sea control and battlespace dominance). 
As the Navy budget continues to shrink ($85 billion in FY-93, 
$77.5 billion in FY-94, $78.6 billion in FY-95 and a projected 
$75.6 billion in FY-96), it is imperative that we allocate our 
resources to areas where they·are most needed. 
The FY-94 Defense budget purchased 36 F/A-18 C/D aircraft 
($1.6 billion), three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers ($2.7 
billion) and a sixth Wasp-class LHD ($1.2 billion). The only 
helicopter funded was the Marine AH-1W (twelve for $145 
million). The six high-speed PHM hydrofoils were decommissioned, 
nine HH-608 combat search and rescue helicopters were cancelled 
and funding for improvements to P-3 reconnaissance aircraft was 
slashed by $100 million •120 The greatest decrease in Navy 
Research and Development funding came in undersea warfare 
programs while the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air missile 
(AMRAAM) was fully funded. 121 Funding for C3 countermeasures was 
cancelled, AV-8C R&D was deleted and the procurement schedule 
for air-to-surface missiles was reduced. 
120Department of Defense, Congressional Action on FY 1994 
Aggrogriation Regyest (Washington, DC: Office of the Comptroller 
of the DOD, January 1994), 65-67. 
121Center for Strategic Strategies and Operations. Tomorrow's 
Fleet; Effective Force or Botten Timber? (Arlington, VA: 
Techmatics, Inc., 1994), 8. 
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The FY-95 Defense budget, billed as the first comprehensive 
defense budget by Defense Secretary William Perry, requested 
$43.3 billion in procurement spending. Included in this is 
$3.65 billion for a ninth Nimitz-class nuclear carrier (CVN-76) 
which represents 42% of all shipbuilding funds in the FY-95 
budget. In addition, $2.7 billion was authorized for three more 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and $1 billion was appropriated 
for 24 F /A-18 C/D aircraft . 122 A total of $320 million was 
allocated to mine warfare programs and $500 million was doled 
out to continue studying the v-22, effectively putting off that 
decision for another year. 
The FY-96 budget is currently being developed and already 
serious problems appear on the horizon for a nUJDber of Navy 
programs. There may be a lack of funding for five mine warfare 
programs including plans to equip Marine air cushion landing 
craft (LCACs) with mine sweeping gear, the Magic Lantern 
airborne mine detection system and procurement of 15 SLQ-53 
deep-water sweeps for the MHC-51 class mine hunters. Additional 
cuts are proposed against Naval aviation including the delay of 
a plan to outfit H-60 helicopters with Hellfire and Penguin 
missile systems. Funding to overhaul and refuel a nuclear 
aircraft carrier ($1.5 billion), to purchase three additional 
122Nayy Times, "New Aircraft Carrier Gets All-Clear Signal." 
April 25, 1994, 3. 
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Arleiqh Burkes ($2.7 billion) and 18 F/A-18C/Ds ($750 million) 
appears safe from the budqet ax at this tiae. 
These numbers indicate that the Navy continues to pursue a 
downsized version of a Cold war procurement strategy aimed at 
purchasing the ships, aircraft and weapon systems it needs to 
project power ashore. Despite the rhetoric associated with 
" ••• From the Sea," the Navy continues to neglect purchasing the 
less glamorous systems which it vitally needs to dominate the 
littoral regions of the world. Muddling along in this way 
results in a chronic suboptimization of organizational 
performance, costly in the business world, potentially deadly 
for the u.s. Navy. 
In order to successfully bridge the gap between doctrine and 
capabilities, a long-term procurement strategy aimed at 
improving our ability to control the battlespace of the 
littorals is necessary. Ships, aircraft and weapon systems take 
years to develop and introduce to the fleet. Because of this, 
any radical changes to our near-term procurement strategy will 
probably have to occur by adding new capabilities to existing 
platforms. This requires a ruthless program of recapitalization 
and modernization in order to build the framework and foundation 
for tomorrow's fleet. With this in mind, the following 
procurement recommendations are made: 
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1. ••val Aviation. 
The view that sea-based airpower can, and should, 
accomplish the entire range of aerial missions in warfare has 
forced the Navy to spread itself very thin in aircraft 
procurement. In the 1980s the Navy spent $10 billion on new 
aircraft programs without a single operational aircraft ever 
reaching the fleet. The A-6F, F-140, A-12 and the AF/X, all 
power projection aircraft, have all been cancelled. The only 
survivor of this procurement cycle is the V-22-, a program which 
remains on extended life-support only through extraordinary 
efforts by the Marine Corps and certain members of Congress. 
In the future, the Navy's deep-strike mission will be 
performed by Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from surface 
ships and submarines. The success of the Tomahawk during 
Operation Desert Storm and the adversity to risking aircrews and 
expensive manned aircraft to perform this mission will allow 
Naval aviation to be reoriented towards achieving the primary 
missions of the Navy in littoral warfare: local air superiority 
and close air support (CAS) for expeditionary forces ashore. 
This would permit the accelerated decommissioning of the Navy's 
A-6E squadrons and the cancellation of the A-6 upgrade program 
funded in the FY-94 budget. 
In the 1980s, the Navy bought, on average, almost 800 
aircraft per year: in FY-95 we will buy less than 100. The 
Navy's increased reliance on the F/A-18C/D makes the development 
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of an improved aircraft with greater payload, endurance and 
capabilities (F/A-18 E/F) a critical procurement choice. An 
iaproved version of the Harrier VTOL jet (AV-SC) and the 
Advanced Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) aircraft 
should be pursued to enhance the capabilities of the eleven 
large deck amphibious ships to serve in a true forward 
presence/crisis response role. 
Stealth also becomes less important if you eliminate the 
deep-strike mission. What is important for close air support 
and air superiority is long loiter times, a large payload 
capacity, precision-guided weapons and seamless communication 
with expeditionary forces. Forward-looking infrared equipment, 
integrated GPS, night vision capabilities, improved displays and 
increased payload are attributes which should be strived for in 
future aircraft procurement and modernization programs. 
A recent Navy-Marine corps war game, Naval Logistics 
2001, pointed out the deficiencies in fighting an MRC in 2001. 
Among the shortfalls were a lack of sufficient standoff weapons 
to sustain the force as well as significant shortages in ground 
forces ordnance. Less than a third of the naval aircraft which 
participated in the Gulf War carried precision-guided weapons. 123 
Outfitting all carrier-based aircraft with advanced, multi-
sensor precision weapons would provide the Navy with a much 
123Rand Research Review, "Airpower and the Changing Face of 
Battle." 17 (Fall 1993): 1-3. 
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greater ability to conduct the anti-surface and close air 
support missions required in littoral warfare. Standoff 
weapons, including the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), the 
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSW) and the Tri-Service Standoff Attack 
Missile (TSSAM) would be particularly useful when conducting the 
ship defense and anti-surface missions. 
The inadequacies of the Marine's H-46E helicopter (130 
knot speed, 1.3 hour fuel capacity, non-inflight refuelable and 
severe flight restrictions) represent an Achilles heel of the 
Marine Corps "Operational Maneuver ••• From the Sea." Because of 
the H-46's deficiencies, the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) is 
going to have to get very close to shore in order to conduct a 
full-scale amphibious operation, leaving the LHA/LHD vulnerable 
to surface, subsurface and air attack. To avoid this, the V-22 
Osprey needs to be freed from the political morass which it has 
been bogged down in since the mid-1980s. It should be made a 
top priority of the Navy's leadership and production should be 
pushed to ensure that the aircraft reaches the fleet before 
2000. 
All tactical Naval aircraft should also have the 
capability to detect, track and attack small surface combatants 
which threaten the battle group. A standoff weapon of moderate 
range and size, such as the Harpoon, can permit aircraft to 
attack these ships from outside of the SAM range. Non-lethal 
technologies may also provide some interesting possibilities. 
Disabling a warship's sensors with a fragmentation weapon 
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detonated overhead or using a precision-guided weapon to take 
out the ship's steering system are two examples of this type of 
warfare. Given the proliferation of portable SAMs, Naval 
aircraft operating in the littorals should be equipped with 
defensive countermeasure systems such as the AN/ALQ-144 Infrared 
JalllJDer and AN/ALE-47 chaff/ffare dispenser. 
2. The Surface Pleet 
The u.s. Navy is already colllJDitted to the platforms 
which will be the backbone of the fleet well into the twenty-
first century. Just as Naval aviation has committed to the F/A-
18, the surface fleet has committed to the Arleigh Burke and 
Ticonderoga Aegis-class ships and the Wasp and LPD-17 (LX) class 
amphibious assault ships. If we look at the fleet of 2010, we 
discover that 73% of all tactical aircraft, 99% of all surface 
combatants and 75% of the amphibious lift ships have already 
been committed to with long-lead time funding. 124 
The surface fleet of 2000 will be centered around 12 
aircraft carriers, 11 large deck amphibious assault ships, 27 
Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers and 32 Arleigh Burke class 
destroyers. All surface combatants will be powered by gas 
turbine or nuclear propulsion. The improved Flight IIA Arleigh 
Burke class destroyers will be outfitted with a helicopter 
hanger, advanced Sea Sparrow missiles and numerous other systems 
designed to enhance its littoral warfare capabilities. The 21st 
124Captain Ron Gumbert (USN), Assistant Deputy Director 
Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) Joint Staff, interview by 
author, 2 May 1994, Monterey, CA, tape recording. 
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Century Destroyer (SC-21) and the Future surface Combatant (CGX) 
are programs which will further enhance our ability to dominate 
the lit~oral battlespace. 
Tailoring the Navy's surface fleet t perform the 
missions envisioned in " •.• From the Sea" requires that add-on 
systems and technologies be' procured as a near-term fix for 
existing platforms. Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) technologies 
can provide many of the required improvements. A good place to 
start would be with the thirteen PC class special operations 
ships. Too large, poorly armed and unable to defend themsel·res, 
these ships are a single mission platform at best. They must be 
improved and their missions expanded if they are to be justified 
in an era of continuously declining resources. Adding a 
surface-to-surface missile capability and a anti-missile defense 
system would make these craft much more valuable to the fleet. 
To free up valuable ship-building funds, the Navy should 
also accept a smaller carrier force and cancel CVN-76 and CVN-
77. At $4.3 billion a piece, it is difficult to justify risking 
these assets to conduct the low-intensity, regional missions of 
the future. By cancelling CVN-76 and CVN-77, the carrier force 
numbers would decrease to elev~n in 2003, ten in 2007 when USS 
Constellation is retired and nine when the uss John F. Kennedy 
is decommissioned in 2010. With nine aircraft carriers and 
eleven large deck amphibious assault ships, the Navy appears 
well equipped to maintain its power projection and crisis 
response missions: forward presence may be accomplished using 
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other assets. The money saved by cancelling these two carriers 
would be better spent pursuing alternative aircraft carrier 
plans and developing an advanced Harrier STOVL type aircraft. 
The focus of future expeditionary warfare is on the need to 
quickly and efficiently transport Marines from our Amphibious 
Task Forces to the shore. This means that programs like the v-22 
osprey, Advanced Amphibian Assault Vehicle (AAAV), LCAC (Air 
cushion Assault Craft and the follow-on amphibious landing dock 
ships (LX/LPD-17) must be a top priority of the Navy and Mar.:ne 
Corps' procurement strategy. Blocking Congress' desire to fund 
an unnecessary seventh Wasp class LHD could allow the Marine 
Corps to transfer valuable funds into these programs while 
preserving the integrity of the Corps' eleven ARG force 
structure. 
For the rest of this decade, tactical ballistic missiles 
attacking ships moving on the high seas will not be a 
problem. No one has for sale a ballistic missiles that's 
going to steer its way into a moving ship. But when you 
approach the littoral area and you've got ships anchored, 
it's something that you've got to be very concerned about. 125 
Theater ballistic missile defense systems, operating 
in concert with airborne early warning systems, can provide 
area defense for joint expeditionary forces. A TBMD system 
could also be used to provide protection for host-nation bases 
and airfields as well as population centers in the area. In 
fact, nearly 60% of all of the world's population centers can 
125Edward Shaefer, Jr. (Rear Admiral, USN) Defense Week (24 
May 1993): 13. 
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be protected by even a minimal TBMD system. 126 Given the 
increasing likelihood that u.s. Naval warships and 
expeditionary forces will operate within range of surface-to-
surface missiles, deploying sea-based TBMD systems to a crisis 
area should be a top priority. 
Deploying Patriot batteries to overseas crisis areas 
takes time and is inherently cumbersome. Sea-based TBMD 
systems offer the same advantages of traditional naval forces: 
rapid response time, high flexibility, mobility and standoff 
range. The Navy's sea-based TBMD programs, both upper and 
lower tier systems, appear to enjoy widespread political and 
military support. The lower-tier systems are designed to be 
fitted to existing assets, the Navy's Aegis cruisers and 
destroyers. These ships are already equipped with the SPY-1A 
and D radar systems, Vertical Launch System (VLS), extensive 
C3 capabilities and between 90 (Burke) and 122 (Ticonderoga) 
Standard Missiles which will eventually be upgraded to the SM-
2 Block IV. 127 Using the extensive Aegis infrastructure should 
allow lower-tier TBMD to be developed in the near-term and at 
a relatively low cost. Upper tier systems research is 
centered on developing a variant of the Army's THAAD long-
range interceptor to provide even broader protection for joint 
and allied forces. 
126Rodney P. Kempt (Captain, USN), "Killing Scuds From the 
Sea," u.s. Naval Institute Proceedings 119 (June 1993): 53.· 
127National Defense, "Sea-Based Shield Will Counter Missile 
Threat." 79 (February 1994): 26-27. 
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Despite its obvious importance, TBMD has been the 
subject of recent cutbacks. The FY-94 budget request 
allocated $240 million for Navy TBMD programs out of a total 
BMD initiative of $1. 8 billion. A recent Co::1gressional Budget 
Office report stated that only two core TBMD programs could be 
supported through FY-99. In l.ight of these developments, this 
may be one case where a single service management and 
procurement plan may be in the best interests of all the 
services. Redesignating the Navy as the program manager and 
bringing Army and Air Force funding under its purview would 
streamline the acquisition and fielding of a viable TBMD 
system. 
provided 
Navy TBMD programs should also be accelerated and 
with increased budget support within the BMD 
initiative. 
To successfully execute forcible-entry operations from 
the sea, the Navy needs a ship-based fire support system 
(NSFS) which is capable of delivering a high volume of fire up 
to 20 miles in all weather conditions. However, with the 
decommissioning of the New Jersey class battleships, the Navy 
is left with only its 5 inch Mark 45 Mod 2 gun to provide 
gunfire support for expeditionary units ashore. This gun 
fires 20 conventional "dumb" rounds per minute up to 13 miles 
with limited accuracy, hardly sufficient to support an opposed 
amphibious landing. 
In the near-term, 
characteristics of the Mark 
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improving the ballistic 
45 round and testing the 
feasibility of using high energy, low vulnerability 
propellants is the preferred solution. The Army's tactical 
missile system (ATACMS) and the Multiple Launch Rocket system 
(MLRS) are being studied to determine their suitability as 
mid-term solutions. The long-term proposal is the New 
Generation Gun (a 155mm weapon with a range of 50 miles) and 
the MK-31 5 inch Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) but neither is 
projected to enter service until 2010. None of these 
proposals holds the promise of being the definitive answer to 
the Navy's gunfire support problem. 
Therefore the scale of investment in Naval gunfire 
support should be adjusted to reflect its importance to the 
success of the missions envisioned in 11 ••• From the sea. 11 
Research and development funds must be allocated to the study 
of new technologies like electro-thermal guns and kinetic-
energy rounds. Future ship designs like the LPD-17 amphibious 
landing dock, Flight Three Arleigh Burke class destroyers and 
the 21st Century Destroyer must have the capability to provide 
all-weather naval gunfire support to expeditionary units 
ashore. 
Operating close to shore in crisis response scenarios 
also requires that Navy ships be able to defend themselves 
against a wide-variety of threats including anti-ship missiles 
and submarines. Sailing a single warship into an area to show 
the flag may be inviting disaster. Ships must also be able to 
fight in a variety of environments including chemical and 
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nuclear contaminated areas. Research should continue into 
improving ship self-defense capabilities including advanced 
sensors, electro-thermal 9Uns, laser weapons, decoys and 
automatic response weapons. Whether the group is a nuclear 
aircraft carrier or an individual warship, the fear of 
escalation must remain subservient to the desire to protect 
our ships, ~raft and personnel. 
With the focus of naval warfare shifting towards 
control of the littorals, naval forces will be required to 
stay much closer to shore than they traditionally have and 
operate with a wide variety of American and coalition forces. 
Expanding the Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 
Intelligence (C4I) capabilities of existing warships will 
therefore be critical for conducting the types of future joint 
operations that " ••• From the Sea" envisions. Modern 
communications and data systems have given us present us the 
ability to provide an incredible amount of data to our Naval 
commanders. However, adapting inherited "legacy" systems to 
incorporate modern technologies is a difficult challenge for 
Navy planners and researchers. Many existing "stovepipe" 
systems, such as the UYK-43 and -44 shipboard processors were 
developed with little regard for interoperability with other 
services or our allies. 
Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) technologies can also 
provide near-term solutions for many of these C4I problems. 
In April 1994, an integrated hardware and software 
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architecture, linked by a fiber optic local area network 
(LAN), was successfully demonstrated aboard the uss 
Independence (CV-62) by C3 Inc. and Sun Microsystems.u• 
Satellite technologies and improvements in existing 
communications and intelligence gathering systems offer 
additional possibilities and should receive priority funding 
in future Navy budgets. 
3. StU.arines and Undersea Warfare 
Dominating the undersea battlespace · is crucial in 
allowing the surface ships and expeditionary units to get 
close enough to perform their missions. Given the nuclear 
attack submarine's inherent stealthiness and unequalled 
ability to project power ashore, it should be viewed as a 
critical component of the littoral warfare team. Submarines 
also play an important role in surveillance and insertion of 
special operations teams in advance of an amphibious assault 
as well as in the mine warfare effort. Submarines may detect 
mines using remotely-piloted craft and on-board sensor as well 
as laying Mk-67 mines themselves. 
So far, the submarine service appears to have taken 
the lead in integrating existing platforms into the new 
littoral warfare plan. Attack submarines now deploy with 
carrier and amphibious surface groups, emphasizing special 
warfare, mining, shallow-water operations and strike warfare. 
128Edward J. Walsh, "Navy Aims at Joint Operations Roles and 
Economies for C4I." Sea Power (April 1994): 52. 
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American nuclear attack submarines participate actively in 
NATO exercises and conduct training with deployed American 
battle 9roups. They are quiet, multi-mission platforms 
despite their great cost; the perfect type of weapon for the 
u.s. Navy. 
The first units of the Los Angeles class nuclear 
attack submarines are being decommissioned thirteen years 
earlier than originally planned. At the same time, plans for 
the desiC)n and procurement of the New Attack SUbmarine (NSSN} 
are being developed with the Seawolf acting as a "bridge" 
between the two classes •129 At $2.4 billion a copy, using the 
Seawolf as a "bridge" until long-lead funding for the NSSN is 
requested in FY-97, seems financially irresponsible in an era 
of diminishing resources. 
Improving the current Los Angeles class boats and 
slowing down their decommissioning would serve as a much more 
efficient bridge until the NSSN is funded and built. The uss 
San Juan (SSN-751} is the first of the SSN-688I (Improved Los 
Angeles class} attack boats. Adding Harpoon anti-missiles, 
active sonar and improved Mark 48 ADCAP torpedoes to existing 
Los Angeles class boats has greatly improved their warfighting 
potential at a relatively minimal cost. The SSN-688I class 
boats are also outfitted with the AN/BSY-1 integrated combat 
suite. All aspects of the submarine's combat systems, 
including targeting information from all sensors, is 
129Center for Strategic Strategies and Operations, 3 3. 
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coordinated and the output is then fed to individual weapon 
syste•s. A follow-on suite, the AN/BSY-2, is being developed 
for the Seawolf but it could also be backfitted to the SSN-
6881 class boats. 
What is needed to realize the full potential of future 
nuclear attack submarines are highly integrated, modular 
systems using advanced technology and weapon systems. The 
Seawolf has serious deficiencies; it is not designed for 
operations in the littoral battlespace and it cannot carry 
special operations teams. With this in mind, the third 
se.j"-'c:..f (SSN-23) should be cancelled. The NSSN is designed to 
be a truly multi-mission platform, capable of carrying modules 
for special operations, cruise missile VLS cells and perhaps 
even ballistic missiles. In production, the NSSN is projected 
to be significantly more capable and about half ($1.3 billion) 
of what the seawolf will cost. Further research into Air 
Independent Propulsion ( AIP) as an alternative means of 
propulsion also holds promise for future submarine designs. 
As previously noted in chapter three, Strategic 
Ballistic Missile Submarines ( SSBNs) are well prepared to 
provide the supporting leg of our strategic nuclear triad well 
into the 21st century. With the decommissioning of the last 
Polaris missile submarines in FY-94, the strategic deterrence 
mission will fall to the eighteen existing Trident class 
SSBNs. A deficiency exists in that there is currently no 
program for a follow-on to the Trident SSBN submarine fleet. 
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The Departllent of Defense's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review 
needs to address the issue of a follow-on for the Trident SSBN 
and the future of the Trident II/D5 ballistic aissile, a 
program which is allegedly being considered for termination. no 
The world's other 425 submarines also represent a 
significant threat to the u ~ s. Navy. In a Major Regional 
conflict (MRC), the United States would rely on sealift to 
transport the majority of reinforcements and supplies into a 
theater. Diesel-electric submarines, whether operating 
independently or as a pack, represent a potential "war-
breaker" if they are allowed to roam free and interdict 
regional shipping in the area. During the Falkland's War, a 
large amount of resources and ordnance was expended during 
anti-submarine operations against a single Argentine diesel-
electric submarine, the san Luis. Despite the best efforts of 
the British Task Force commander, the San Luis successfully 
eluded all detection efforts. 131 
Detecting and engaging enemy submarines should then be 
a top priority of the Navy's leadership and funded 
appropriately. Unfortunately, shallow-water anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) is an extremely difficult proposition. The 
world's littoral regions are characterized by difficult 
acoustic conditions, shallow water and numerous surface 
130Ibid. , 35. 
131P. Kevin Peppe, (Lieutenant Commander, USN), "Submarines 
in the Littorals." u.s. Nayal Institute Proceedings 119 (July 
1993): 47. 
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clutter in the form of small ships and boats. Active, rather 
than passive, sonar represents the best tool for detecting 
submarines in these conditions. The retirement of the Navy's 
H-3 squadrons and the cancellation of H-60F procurement has 
retarded the Navy's airborne active sonar capabi 1 i ty. No 
greater threat exists to ·successful operations in the 
littorals than a professionally operated diesel submarine, yet 
our efforts to counter the threat have received scant 
attention. 
Mine warfare programs have historically been ignored 
or cut by Navy planners because its programs tend to offer 
small targets that don't raise Congress' ire like the 
cancellation of larger weapon systems does. Despite the 
mining of the USS Tripoli, USS Princeton and USS Samuel B. 
Roberts in the Persian Gulf, policy rhet~ric still diverges 
from the reality of funding these programs. Adequate research 
and development funding needs to be allocated and protected 
against budget cuts to achieve a responsive shallow-water mine 
detection and countermeasures capability in the immediate 
future. 
The current mine warfare plan calls for 26 mine 
countermeasures ships (MHC-51 osprey and MCM-1 Avenger 
classes) , two squadrons of MH-53E helicopters and one MCM 
command-control and support ship (LPH-12, uss Inchon). 
Unfortunately, all of these assets will be based in Ingleside, 
Texas and many of them may be transferred to the Naval 
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Reserve. Forward basing of mine warfare assets should be 
considered. An organic mine-hunting and neutralization 
capability should be deployed with all carrier and amphibious 
battle groups. To do otherwise risks neutering the effect 
that these groups can have in regional crisis scenarios. 
Equipping Marine LCACs with mine sweeping gear and adding the 
Magic Lantern laser detection system to H-60 helicopters would 
accomplish this at a minimal cost. 
Countermining is an effective tactical measure for 
containing a crisis in its early stages and provides a first 
step in establishing sea control. The problem is that the 
U.s. Navy has no surface ships equipped to lay mines. 
Submarines can lay a :dmi ted number of mines but aerial 
minelaying is the only option for laying the type of large 
minefield necessary to close a port. The Navy should 
therefore consider resurrecting its own offensive and 
defensive mine laying capability and develop the tactics and 
doctrine necessary to utilize these capabilities effectively. 
D. SUMMARY 
As we approach the 21st century, a key question is whether 
a trimmed down, largely CONUS-based u.s. military can win a 
Major Regional Conflict launched by a Third World nation with 
little or no warning. In most cases, the u.s. Navy will be 
the first on-scene and the primary instrument of American 
diplomacy and coercion. Success in this scenario will depend 
on how well the Navy is able to overcome the challenges of 
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small forward deployments, short warning times, great 
deployment distances and the increasingly sophisticated nature 
of the Third World threat. 
The Navy's new doctrine, " ••• From the Sea" provides the 
Navy with a framework to adjust to these challenges. In order 
to fulfill its potential, • ••• From the Sea" requires a 
commitment from the Navy's leadership to train 3nd equip our 
sailors with the equipment they need to perform future 
missions. When deployed in support of National command 
Authority objectives, naval forces must be able to control the 
littoral battlespace, defend themselves and possess sufficient 
warfighting potential to prosecute the crisis should 
deterrence fail. New platforms and weapon systems, as well as 
imaginative uses for existing systems, are necessary if we 
hope to exercise sea control , deter aggression and, when 
deterrence fails, quickly and decisively defeat the enemy at 
minimum cost to our own forces. 
However, we are five years into the post-Cold War era yet 
we are still training, operating and buying with a Cold-War 
mentality. The absence of a major global threat makes this an 
opportune time to launch a concerted effort aimed at plugging 
the holes in areas which we are vulnerable. Many of these 
areas are the very capabilities which are crucial for success 
in littoral warfare: close air support, mine detection and 
countermeasures, shallow-water ASW, coastal patrol craft, 
reconnaissance and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD). 
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Navy leaders and their Congressional supporters should 
therefore refocus their efforts away from power projection and 
towards improving the Navy's ability to control the 
battlespace of the littorals. 
To enhance our capabilities while maintaining a 
substantially smaller force and spending less money, the Navy 
must make tough procurement choices while seeking to further 
expand its qualitative edge. Specifically, it must make 
significant investments in precision-guided munitions, 
advanced military aircraft and state-of-the-art command, 
control and communications systems. It may also be necessary 
for the Navy to postpone certain improvements or abandon 
certain missions in order to refocus and selectively modernize 
elements of the fleet. Unless we approach the future with 
innovation and creativity, the threat that naval forces are 
exposed to may eventually render gunboat diplomacy obsolete as 
a tool for protecting America's national interests. 
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VI. COIICLUSIOIIS 
As we approach the 21st century, a key question is whether 
a trimmed down, largely CONUS-~ased u.s. military can win a 
Major Regional Conflict launched by a Third World nation with 
little or no warning. Many Third World nations are outfitting 
their militaries with modern, nigh-tech weapon systems which 
utilize the latest sensor and communications technologies as 
well as weapons of mass destruction. When combined with 
declining American defense budgets and a rapidly decreasing 
oversea presence, it is apparent that the likelihood of 
encountering resistance and/or attack may have increased 
significantly for u.s. forces. This is especially 
disconcerting for the u.s. Navy, usually first on-scene and 
the likely target of any initial challenge to our presence in 
a region. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the United States Navy 
has consistently faced an identifiable adversary. our force 
structure, training and doctrine were all designed to contend 
with the thre~t which our opponent's naval forces presented to 
our mast~ry of the seas. The absence of a serious blue-water 
threat today requires that we move beyond the writings of 
Mahan in order to develop ways of using our existing and 
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future forces to further our national goals and interests 
while countering the emerging threat to our presence. 
Waging war in the world's littoral regions is 
intrinsically difficult: the opponent has the home-field 
advantage and experience conducting operations in his local 
waters. In future low-intensity regional conflicts, the u.s. 
Navy will operate in these areas, close to an enemy's shore 
and well within range of an imposing array of sophisticated 
weapon systems. Success under these conditions will depend on 
t~ .. e Navy's ability to exercise sea control and dominate the 
littoral battlespace. 
The Navy's new doctrine, " ••• From the Sea" provides the 
Navy with a framework to adjust to these challenges. However, 
in order to fulfill its potential, " ••• From the Sea" requires 
a commitment from the Navy's leadership to train and equip our 
sailors with the equipment they need to perform future 
missions. Naval forces must be able to control the littoral 
battlespace, defend themselves and possess sufficient 
warfighting potential to prosecute the crisis should 
deterrence fail. New platforms and weapon systems, as well as 
imaginative uses for existing systems, are necessary if we 
hope to exercise sea control, deter aggression and, when 
deterrence fails, quickly and decisively defeat the enemy at 
minimum cost to our own forces. 
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If the u.s. Navy is serious about " ••• From the sea" and 
the operations that it envisions, we should be able to verify 
it by analyzing the restructuring of the fleet. 
Unfortunately, our recapitalization strategy appears to 
concentrate on improving the areas in which we have an 
overwhelming dominance (power projection) while neglecting 
areas in which we are weak and potentially vulnerable (sea 
control and battlespace dominance). 
This is potentially disasterous for the u.s. Navy. We are 
five years into the post-Cold War era yet we are still 
training, operating and buying with a Cold-War mentality. The 
absence of a major global threat makes this an opportune time 
to launch a concerted effort aimed at plugging the holes in 
areas which we are vulnerable. Many of these areas are the 
very capabilities which are crucial for success in littoral 
warfare: close air support, mine detection and 
countermeasures, shallow-water ASW, coastal patrol craft, 
reconnaissance and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD). 
Navy leaders and their congressional supporters should 
therefore refocus their efforts away from power projection and 
towards improving the Navy's ability to control the 
battlespace of the littorals. 
To enhance our capabilities while maintaining a 
substantially smaller force and spending less money, the Navy 
must make tough procurement choices while seeking to further 
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expand its qualitative edge. specifically, it must make 
significant investments in precision-guided munitions, 
advanced military aircraft and state-of-the-art command, 
control and communications systems. It may also be necessary 
for the Navy to postpone certain improvements or abandon 
certain missions in order to refocus and selectively modernize 
elements of the fleet. Unless we approach the future with 
innovation and creativity, the threat that naval forces are 
exposed to may eventually render gunboat diplomacy obsolete as 
a tool for protecting America's national interests. 
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